

FEELING AS THE PRINCIPLE
OF
INDIVIDUATION AND SOCIALIZATION

BY
RUDOLPH M. BINDER, A.B.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

New York
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
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FEELING AS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION AND SOCIALIZATION.

INTRODUCTION.

WHENEVER we come into relations with our fellowman, one fact impresses itself more strongly on our mind than any other, viz., the infinite variety of their mental constitutions. There are large differences in this respect between the man and the woman, the child and the youth, the man in the prime of life and the man of mature years, the civilized and the barbarian, the lawyer and the scholar, the minister and the business man, the saint and the sinner. Men may differ largely in their physical constitution, but to the careful observer the difference in mental constitution is still greater and more striking. The endless variety in this respect is, indeed, a surprise to everybody. And the surprise grows when we recognize that all these variations arise from the same elementary facts of consciousness. Men seem to hate and love, to desire and reject the same things. They seem to have the same ambitions and aspirations, whether they live in the palace of a king, or in a laborer's cottage. Whence come, then, these differences which make the study of man so absorbingly interesting, and give zest to life?

There are two possibilities. We may explain the differences in the mental constitutions of men through the difference in their environment. There are many reasons in favor of this explanation. For is it not true that man is largely a product of his environment? Has it not been proved again and again that slums in large cities breed lust and crime, simply because the children of the tenements see chiefly these sides of human

activity? Is it not true also that the barbarian has different tastes and views from those of civilized man because his society differs from that of the latter? Why should not environment, then, explain the differences in the mental constitutions of men?

Environment explains some differences, but not all of them, —not even those which are most striking. We find, namely, that men living under the same external conditions vary greatly in disposition and character. Children growing up in the same family, and receiving the same care and instruction, show differences as early as mental life begins to manifest itself. Environment can certainly not be responsible for these. Where, then, must we look for an explanation?

The other possibility suggests itself as a reason to account for the mental differences of men. If they are not to be found in the environment, they must certainly be looked for in the innate tendencies which each man brings with him into the world. They must be a gift from the bountiful hand of nature, which creates not only all men, but even plants and animals with a distinct individuality of their own. In the case of man this individuality is very marked, because it consists not only of physical but also of mental characteristics. The latter are the most significant, and we are, therefore, concerned with them alone. But if the principal differences between men consist of innate mental characteristics, there are three possible ways of explanation. There is a time-honored division of the manifestations of human consciousness into intellect, will, and emotions; and we have no good reason to depart from this division. Let us try to find out, then, whether the differences existing among men are due to their intellect, their will, or their emotions.

We may concede at once to those who claim that the mark of differentiation among men is due to peculiarities of the intellect, that men differ greatly in this respect. We know men to be ignorant or learned, foolish or wise, well-informed or ill-informed. And we rate them accordingly into a scale, with the ignoramus at the lower and the savant at the upper end.

We feel, however, that this classification does not strike the essential difference in the mental constitution of men. The man who is ignorant to-day may be the best informed savant twenty years from now. It has occurred not infrequently that men who stood at the lower end of barbarism have, within a few years of European training, acquired practically all the knowledge which the best seats of learning had to give. The fact is, that what is one man's knowledge may become the knowledge of any other man. To look, consequently, for the most striking differences in the mental constitution of men to the intellect, is not an adequate procedure.

Neither do differences in will-power explain the uniqueness of each human individuality. We do, indeed, classify men as weak and strong according to their will-power, as fickle and persevering according to the duration of the application of their powers to the carrying out of plans. But here we again feel that the classification is inadequate, since the same man may pursue one plan tenaciously and another half-heartedly. A man who appears to-day as absolutely incapable of carrying out a plan consistently, may to-morrow, with a proper motive to action, surprise everybody with his enthusiastic persistence in obtaining a certain end. The will, then, does not give us a criterion of individual differences, because what one man *wills*, all men *may will*.

There remain only the emotions as a possible explanation of differentiation. The objection will, however, immediately be made that as the same man *wills* one thing more than another, or *knows* one thing better than another, so he likes one thing better than another, and that, consequently, men differ no more in regard to their emotions than they do in regard to their volitions and cognitions. We may admit this objection to be valid, and we may also admit that the same man likes one thing strongly to-day, which he liked but little yesterday, because he has found that other men like it strongly. There seems to be, therefore, but little difference between men even in their emotions, since these seem to be as common to all men as their volitions and their cognitions. And still, there is a difference

here, namely, in regard to the degree in which they can be communicated and objectified. It is clear that knowledge can be communicated, since our whole educational system is based on that presupposition. It is also clear that volitions can be objectified as soon as they find their consummation in action. But emotions *per se* can neither be communicated nor objectified. If we talk or write about them, it is knowledge concerning them that we communicate, and not emotions. If they impel us to action, it is the volition which is objectified, and not the emotions. We may gauge their strength and quality from the state of knowledge and the kind of action which they produce, but we can never know an emotion directly. Here we have, then, a state of consciousness which is confined to the individual. Consciousness as a state of cognition and of volition is communicable and objectifiable through physical media; but consciousness as a state of emotion must become cognition or volition in order to be noticed at all by the observer. It may be possible, therefore, that all men have the same emotions, but they are confined to the individual consciousness in each case. They cannot be shared, while cognitions and volitions may become public property and be shared by all. What one man knows, all men may know; what one man does, all men may do. But what you or I feel, other men may feel only in so far as the states of knowledge communicated to them about your or my emotions produce similar emotions in them. And the latter does not always take place. Two men may have knowledge of the same fact, *e. g.*, of my love, but in the one an emotion of hatred will be produced against me, while in the other, this knowledge may result in love for me, or in a feeling of indifference, or perhaps in nothing at all beyond the mere fact of knowledge. Emotions, or, using the broader term, feelings, are, then, strictly individual.

We may approach the same problem from another point of view. Why do men seek certain kinds of information, or do certain acts? The answer—both of common sense and of psychology—is, that they like them, *i. e.*, these acts and this information have an interest for them because they produce

pleasurable emotions. Both volitions and cognitions may, consequently, be traced to emotions as their source in the majority of cases, while the reverse is not nearly so often the case. The point can not be argued here, but if it should prove to be true, we should have a key to the problem of self-realization.

By *self-realization of the individual* we mean *the harmonious development of all his faculties to the greatest possible extent*. If this definition be true, well-being of the individual must be the result, and a feeling of satisfaction the attendant as a register of well-being. Self-realization means, then, activity on the part of the individual, because only by various and continued action can he develop his powers. The question arises, however, what kind of self-realization will he seek? It is not possible to give the answer here, but only to indicate along what lines it will be given. It is plain that the individual will act only along lines in which he is interested. But his interests may either be confined to himself, or include others. If confined to himself, the interest may have arisen either through an unsatisfactory state of emotion, or through an ideal. If extended to others, the interest must have arisen through a representation of them in the intellect, and through a consequent reaction of this representation upon the emotions, since it is a fact of common occurrence that men do not, *e. g.*, relieve the distress of others, unless there is an appeal or a reaction of our representation of them to our emotions. Mere representation of other people's distress cannot and will not make me act; a reaction upon the emotions is necessary to produce this result.

Now in all three cases, action depends ultimately upon the emotions. In the first case the matter is plain, since an unsatisfactory state of emotion will impel me to act in order to get relief, *e. g.*, from pain, or to attain, *e. g.*, an absent pleasure. In the second case the matter is not so plain, since an ideal is considered as something purely intellectual. It is true, of course, that an ideal is largely of an intellectual character. But if it is merely that, it cannot be *my* ideal. If it is my ideal, I am either pleased or displeased with my present condition in

comparison with the ideal; I must love myself or hate myself as I approach to or depart from it. I shall, accordingly, continue or retrace my steps. The best proof that it is only our *own* ideal which is conducive to action is the fact that other men's ideals leave us cold; *e. g.*, the star football player of a college hardly ever has the ambition to shine as a star in the class-room or in examinations, and so he never exerts himself in that direction. In order to act, then, in accordance with an ideal, a man must love it, *i. e.*, there must be a reaction upon his emotions. The third case has already been considered as far as it is necessary in the present connection. Emotion played the principal rôle there too. It seems clear now that the emotions are the chief factor in self-realization.

They are, however, not the only factor. In the formation of an ideal the intellect is absolutely necessary; it claims, indeed, the principal share in this mental process. We must, moreover, rely on the intellect for the necessary material and for the operation whenever we form a plan and devise means for its execution. The will, too, performs a function in self-realization. The actual execution of a plan, the removal of obstacles, and the perseverance—necessary in any process of this kind—belong to the will.

Emotion, intellect and will each plays its part in the process of self-realization, *since consciousness is a unity*. We may say that the kind of self-realization we seek depends on the emotions; the means by which it is accomplished, on the intellect; and the extent to which it is attained, on the will. Since, however, all action depends on interest, and since the latter is emotional in its nature, it seems as if the emotions played the chief part in self-realization. Thus we are again face to face with the fact that the emotions are the principle of individuation.

The feelings are also the principle of socialization. There is no social consciousness apart from individuals. A collective, or a general consciousness, which is supposed to be supra-individual, is a myth of unclear thinkers in the past and a dream of sentimentalists in the present. Since we cannot fall

back, then, on a fiction of this kind, we must look to the individual consciousness for a faculty which lends itself to active co-operation and to socialization. There are two possible criteria of the sociality of acts; one is the result, the other is the motive. It seems obvious that the result of an action cannot serve as a real criterion, since we should have to regard some of the greatest scoundrels in history as the greatest benefactors of mankind, because their evil deeds produced, by reaction in their better fellowmen, tremendous changes in society, most of them beneficial. If we take, however, the motive as a criterion of the sociality of an act, we are at once required to look for the spring of all action in man. This we have found in the feelings. If a man is to act socially, he must be socialized in the very core of his consciousness—in his emotions. Otherwise we get those actions which spring from enlightened self-interest, and which, as every fact that becomes known by other men, must necessarily be social in their results, *i. e.*, influence society in one way or another. But a result, that is, an objective criterion, cannot be a true test of sociality, as we have already seen. The emotions are, however, the only subjective criterion, because they supply the motive. If my act is to be judged social, it must spring from a social motive. I must *wish* to help, benefit or please my neighbor, otherwise it is—subjectively, at least—not social, no matter what social results may follow it objectively.

It would follow, therefore, that the emotions must be socialized if we are to have a real socialization of the individual.

Another argument may be advanced along a similar line. The only way to explain psycho-social phenomena is to reproduce them in the individual consciousness. An individual takes part in social tendencies only in so far as he is able *sie nach- und mitzuerleben*, as the Germans would say. The social tendencies of the past he must *nacherleben*, if they are to have any meaning to him; those of the present he must *miterleben*, if he is to understand them. But in either case his sympathies must be enlisted, *i. e.*, there must be a reaction of the intellect upon the emotions. It is owing to the failure to take this fact

into account, that many writers of the purely intellectualistic school are unable to comprehend certain great historical movements. Take the Reformation as an example. Writers of the class referred to can understand and fully appreciate the intellectual part of that movement. The satires of an Ulrich von Hutten, the keen criticisms of an Erasmus, are as plain to them as similar movements to-day. And they urge that this was the whole of the movement. There can be no question, of course, that Humanism and the Renaissance contributed their share towards preparing the minds of the educated for a break with the Church of Rome by furnishing new motives of action and aims of life. It is beyond doubt, too, that these movements had some influence over the common people through their contact with the educated. And still, both Humanism and the Renaissance were essentially movements for and among the educated. The best books produced during that time were written in Latin, and had, therefore, but little influence upon the common people. The mere fact that the classical languages became the medium of intercourse among the learned, sufficed to restrict the two movements to the small number of educated men. There was, perhaps, too much intellectual play and too little moral earnestness in both Humanism and the Renaissance to enlist the full sympathy of the large number of both learned and common people who were disgusted with ecclesiasticism because of its fruits. What was needed to bring about the great movement which resulted in the Reformation was an element of a strongly emotional nature.

Luther supplied that. Being himself of the people, he understood their sympathies and could speak to them as no man of mere erudition and literary cleverness could do. He interpreted their feelings in language which they understood, and they responded immediately. A wave of enthusiasm swept over Germany, and the break with the old system became a matter of time. And the time came soon. When Luther renounced his allegiance to the Church of Rome, Germany followed. What a number of able and scholarly men had not been able to accomplish, this man succeeded in doing with a

few pamphlets which rightly interpreted the feelings of the people. All attempts at reconciliation which have been made since, have been of no avail, simply because the leaders in these movements treated the problem from a purely intellectual point of view, and thus failed to enlist the sympathy of the people. And the historians who close their eyes against this fact are unable to fully understand the causes of the Reformation.

Another illustration from modern times proves the same fact. England has granted Ireland all that can reasonably be asked for. And still the Irish hate the English as much as ever. What is the reason? The English are essentially a people of sturdy common sense, with little sentiment. The Irish are strongly emotional, and feel constantly hurt because the English do not reckon with this fact. This is the chief cause of an animosity which has continued for centuries, and is not likely to abate so long as the English fail to reckon with the emotional prejudices of the Irish.

We have spoken of the self-realization of the individual as if this process were accomplished in isolation. As a matter of fact, the individual needs society for this purpose. He must meet other human beings in order to become cognizant of himself as a person by the interplay of give and take. Two things are necessary if the individual is to realize himself in society. He must (1) learn all that the latter has to teach; and (2) society must be congenial. If the latter condition is not met, he must either seek a society which will furnish him better opportunities for self-realization, *e. g.*, by emigration; or he must try to reform the society in which he is living. In this need of self-realization of the best individuals is born the conscience of the reformer. It springs largely from the emotions. There are many people who recognize the defects of their society clearly, and suggest improvements. There are few whose emotions are so aroused that they will go to work and bring about results. Mere knowledge of the short-comings of society does not give birth to the conscience of the reformer; there must be a reaction from his intellect upon the emotions, *i. e.*, he must not only disapprove of the status quo, but he must have that divine discontent about it which stimulates to action.

Thus we see that feeling is the principle of socialization as well as of individuation. It is the purpose of this paper to throw some light on this problem; positive proof will necessarily be impossible, since the principles of individuation, and consequently those of socialization, are the most difficult problems in philosophy. The method will be to investigate consciousness as a whole from the psychological point of view. Metaphysics will be kept out as far as possible.

The natural division of the paper will be into two parts:

A. The argument that feeling is the principle of individuation. Under this head we shall observe two subdivisions:

I. The rise of self-consciousness through feeling.

II. The function of emotions in man.

B. The argument that feeling is the principle of socialization. This part comprises also two subdivisions:

I. Sources of sociality.

II. Rise and function of the individuating and of the social Me in man.

A. FEELING AS PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION.

I. THE RISE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH FEELING.

If we assume feeling to be the principle of individuation throughout the organic kingdom, we posit at the same time a certain kind of consciousness below man. It will be necessary, therefore, to define these two terms.

Consciousness is the Reaction of an Organism on a Stimulus.

Whatever consciousness may be in itself, does not concern us directly in this paper. What we know of it is through its reactions upon physical stimuli. These reactions take place in and through the organic body, and they are, consequently, objective facts which can be observed and studied.

Along with this objective fact goes, as we know from our own consciousness, a subjective fact which we call feeling. *Feeling* we shall use as an equivalent term for *sensation and emotion*, since it is sometimes more the former, at other times more the latter; although *emotion* will be used only in connection with man. Since we have no exact knowledge of the relation between the objective fact, the reaction, and the subjective fact, feeling, except that they appear invariably together in our own consciousness, we assume that there exists a parallelism between psychical and physiological facts. The reactions of plants have no bearing on our topic, and will, therefore, be omitted for the present; since we are concerned only with conscious and self-conscious, but not with sub-conscious organisms.

The task before us, then, is to show that all conscious life is based on feeling.¹ This task involves two things. We must

¹After completing this thesis, my attention was called to Professor Hiram M. Stanley's work on *Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling*. He supports a similar theory, but does not draw the conclusions that I have attempted to establish.

try to prove *first*, that psychic life among animals consists of feeling, out of which arise a few rudimentary differentiations called *will* and *intellect*; second, that man has risen to self-consciousness through feeling.

I. THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF ANIMALS CONSISTS PRINCIPALLY
OF FEELING.

This can be shown both in micro-organisms and in higher animals. The much-debated question whether micro-organisms have any psychic life at all, or whether their whole activity can be explained on the mechanical, *i. e.*, physico-chemical, principle of reaction, need not trouble us here. All that we are concerned with is the fact that these organisms perform the functions of nutrition and reproduction, and that these functions fix a gulf between the reactions of organic and inorganic bodies.

The psychic life of micro-organisms is very simple. The functions of nutrition and reproduction, with their attendant processes, form the principal stock of psychic activities. Yet these processes require certain adaptations of the organism, which seem to be completely adequate for the purpose. We find, for instance, that protozoa exercise choice in the selection of their food; that they effect fecundation with an individual of their own species, and that in performing these functions, they execute a number of movements calculated to further these activities. Alfred Binet sums up the psychical elements involved in such actions as follows: "1. The perception of the external object; 2. the choice made between a number of objects; 3. the perception of their position in space; 4. movements calculated, either to approach the body and seize it, or to flee from it."¹ In all these cases activity is in direct response to a stimulus. It is, consequently, based on sensations, either of touch or sight. We have no means of ascertaining whether any other sensations are present. But in so far as we can observe the activities of protozoa, we find that they are based on

¹ *The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*, p. 61, of English translation. [I consider these terms of Binet as too advanced, but admit that it is extremely difficult to find suitable ones.]

sensations called forth by outside stimuli. The perception of objects, their localization in space, and the choice made between different objects, are all due to a sensation either of touch or sight. The organs for these sensations may be of the most rudimentary kind, still, they serve the animalcule as guides in its activities, because they enable it to have sensations.

The question arises now, whether the activity of the protozoon is entirely dependent on stimuli from the outside, or whether an inner condition is necessary to account for it. Even if we assume the former attitude, we must concede to the animal the quality of irritability, since stimulation is possible only on the basis of an adequate stimulus and an irritable organ or organism. But we may ask, is activity always only in response to outside stimuli, or are there activities which owe their origin to conditions within the organism itself? It seems to me that this question must be answered in the affirmative. The very fact that life involves nutrition, means that there must be states of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in case of the presence and absence of food in the organism. We may not like to apply such dignified words to the states of a protozoon; perhaps, not even the words "hunger" and "satiety;" but the name by which we choose to call that condition is of secondary importance. All that we need to admit is that a well-fed animal is in a state of psychical equilibrium, and that an ill-fed animal is not. Numerous illustrations of this principle from our own experience and from the observation of higher animals prove this fact, and warrant us in this reasoning from analogy. The animal is, then, in a state of restlessness, or of being *ill-at-ease*, when hungry. There is a strain and a tension in the body, and this innervation from within leads to activity, because it acts as an impulse. We know that this impulse leads man and the higher animals to definite action, calculated to satisfy the craving for food. The lower animals have no *associations*, and do not, therefore, act directly along a line calculated to satisfy hunger. But the sensation of hunger, or loss of psychical equilibrium, or restlessness, or whatever we may choose to call the state produced by absence of food, incites to

action in two ways. It puts, in the first place, the whole body of a protozoon into a state of alertness and excitability, so that any approaching object is noticed and the proper reaction follows. It serves, in the second place, as an impulse to search for food to all those animals, *e. g.*, dogs, whose nervous system is sufficiently developed to enable them to form associations.

There is another series of actions which seems to be determined from within rather than from without—those connected with fecundation. These activities are, however, the result of over-nutrition, while those considered just now were due to under-feeding. The protozoa fecundate in different ways, but a sort of courtship apparently precedes coition. These activities can be due only to a stress from within, which serves as an impulse; they are not responses to objective stimuli only, but are the result principally of excitability and restlessness, which seek and find relief in coition. I quote from Binet: "Upon the approach of the period for propagation, the *Paramecia* come in from all points of the fluid and assemble like little whitish clouds, in more or less numerous groups, about the objects that float upon the surface of the water, or adhere to the side of the vessel containing the tiny artificial sea in which the animalcula are held captive. Intense excitement, which the need of food does not suffice to explain, prevails in each of these groups; a higher instinct appears to dominate all these tiny organisms; they seek each other's company, chase each other about, feel here and there with their cilia, adhere for a moment or so in an attitude of sexual coition, and then retire, soon to begin again. When these minute assemblages are dispersed by shaking the liquid, they quickly form again at other points. These singular antics wherewith animalcula appear to incite each other mutually to copulation, often continue for several days before the latter act is definitely effected."¹

What is the net result of the discussion so far? Simply this: That the psychic life of lower animals—protozoa and metazoa—consists of feeling. If this activity is called forth through an

¹ *The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*, p. 67.

objective stimulus, we have a sensation; if it is due to an inner state of restlessness, we have an impulse with an organic feeling as its basis. The activity of the lower animals thus has its origin either in centrally or peripherally excited sensations.

The same theory holds true concerning the higher animals. They have a more complex psychical life than the protozoa and metazoa, because their faculties are somewhat more developed, and some new ones have appeared. The most prominent among the latter is *association*. Animals of this class, *e. g.*, mammals, are able, moreover, to remember impressions for some time; they have a limited power for imitating, and for being interested. By careful training, some of their instincts may be inhibited, and they are keenly alive to pain and pleasure. But no animals are able to form abstract ideas or concepts of any kind. They cannot, *e. g.*, form the idea of pleasure, and they do not, therefore, go about to seek pleasure. Whenever they act, they do so because of an impulse connected with the associated object. When they are hungry, they do not conceive of a state of satiety and act with a view of reaching that state; but because the state of being *hungry* is an impulse to do something. In all the shows of trained animals which I have attended, the wonderful feats which they accomplished could always be explained by the fact that the trainer applied a stimulus, *e. g.*, food or the whip, which produced not only a pleasurable or painful association, but at the same time, an impulse to act, either to snatch the food or avoid the whip. Professor Thorndike reached a similar conclusion from many experiments. He says: "No cat can form an association leading to an act unless there is included in the association an impulse of its own which leads to the act."¹

But whatever mental life animals may have, it can all be reduced to feeling. Discomfort, hunger, cold, pain, sexual instinct, the instinct to play, all of them are organic feelings which lead to restlessness and excitement, and ultimately to action through the impulse connected with these states. If

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence*, p. 66.

they have any faint idea of a condition different from that in which they are at any given moment, it does certainly not go beyond that of *desire*, or, as the Greek called it, *ἐπιθυμία*, a blind, groping instinct which impels the animal to act out its impulses. The latter can, however, be explained on the theory that they originate in organic feelings and sensations.

2. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IS ATTAINED THROUGH FEELING.

Before we take up this problem, we must make a few remarks about feeling and what it implies. It has been our endeavor thus far to show that the psychic life of animals is principally feeling, and we described the latter as sensation plus emotion. But we reserved the term *emotion* as applicable only to man. There remained, consequently, only sensation in connection with the psychic life of animals. Sensations, however, may be of two kinds, those caused by a stimulus from within and those caused by one from without.¹ Organic feelings, as we may call the centrally-excited sensations, are by far the more important of the two kinds. They appear long before the others do, and outnumber them all through life. They are the source of spontaneous activity in beast and man. There could be no life without them, since there would be no motive to action. We know that among the higher animals and among men, organic feelings appear before birth; we conclude this from certain violent motions which the unborn makes. But the very fact that such motions are made proves that the unborn is capable of reacting upon states which are unfavorable, *e. g.*, pressure. It seems only fair to conclude from the violence of such motions that they are unusually strong reactions, and that, conse-

¹I have identified these two kinds of feelings, for convenience of expression, with centrally and peripherally excited feelings, although this usage is not correct. As the mind becomes differentiated, internal feelings become specialized, and those of them which are originated in the higher nerve centres, especially the brain, are called centrally "excited." I am concerned only with the difference of internal and external, no matter where the former may originate.

quently, the normal condition of the unborn, in both the earlier and later stages, is essentially a life of organic feelings which are not noticed by the mother. In other words, we must posit organic feelings with life itself. They register the well-being of the organism, or its disease; they indicate restlessness, excitement, etc., and thus serve as impulses to action. And action is guided by them alone, since they measure the furthering or the retarding of the organism. We must assume, consequently, that life, organic feelings, and spontaneous action are contemporaneous in the lower and earlier stages of organic beings. This fact has been overlooked by some evolutionists, and is not sufficiently emphasized by others.

But if we must posit organic feelings with life itself, we find that the organism is prepared to react on the environment as soon as the former begins its independent existence. These reactions consist of responses produced by the contact of outside stimuli with the irritable organism. The sensations are modes of information to the organism concerning the environment. But this information must be converted into organic feelings, that is, it must serve as a guide to action by indicating the furtherance or the retarding of life. If it does not serve this purpose, the information is useless to the organism. This brings us to the conclusion that feelings are the paramount psychical energy of all organisms which are not able to reason. For if organic feelings register the well-being or ill-being of the organism, and compel it to take such action as will promote the former and decrease the latter, and if, furthermore, sensations originating in outside stimuli must be converted into organic feelings in order to influence action, we must admit that feeling is the paramount psychical energy of all animals, since the latter cannot reason.

The question is, however, whether organic feelings in animals have the pleasure-pain quality. In regard to the higher animals, this question can be answered definitely in the affirmative; in regard to the lower, only with uncertainty. The lower animals are certainly much less sensitive because of their rudimentary nervous organization. They have, moreover,

fewer organs to manifest either pleasure or pain, and so there is always room for doubt whether they have these sensations when they are exposed to the influence of certain stimuli. Their organic feelings must, however, serve the biological function of furtherance or hindrance, although they may not possess the psychological quality of pleasure and pain. But the function of pleasure and pain is essentially biological, and we have, consequently, a close analogy to the latter sensations in the lower animals. We must not forget, moreover, that pleasure-pain and allied feelings are not the only ones in any organism. There exists a large group of feelings, consisting merely of excitement, without any value as pleasure or pain. And even lower animals manifest these neutral feelings, as we have already seen.¹

If our reasoning has been correct, we may now take another step. Since action is the result of a reaction of organic feelings upon internal or external stimuli, we may consider impulses and instincts as an extension of organic feelings. In all impulsive and instinctive actions, whether among animals or men, instinct plays a decidedly small rôle. These acts are performed without pain, merely in response to an inner pressure. The impulse to do them must be given with an organic feeling, else they will be left undone, since there is no possibility of postponing action by a preconceived plan. An impulse inhibited *now*, means an act not done, since only a new impulse can produce a similar act. But this reasoning applies to instincts as much as to impulses, since instincts are but impulses of long duration. All instincts can be analyzed as a series of successive impulses. Both impulses and instincts have, moreover, this in common, that they are not acquired or taught.² As soon as the necessary organic feelings exist, the animal acts out its instincts in response to these feelings, whether it has ever seen

¹*Cf.* p. 14; Binet on *Paramecia*. [The question of neutral feelings is very uncertain, because we hardly ever find a feeling that is absolutely free from the pleasure-pain quality.]

²It is true, of course, that among the higher animals instincts can be developed, *e. g.*, the chasing instinct in different breeds of dogs.

such actions or not, just as it responds to single sensations by an impulse. The activity of man begins in the same way. The new-born babe must have an appetite for food, sleep, etc., in order to survive. These appetites are, however, nothing else than the acting out of organic feelings, *e. g.*, hunger, weariness, cold, comfort, etc. And the life of the child during the first year depends entirely on the proper performance of these actions, which can neither be taught nor acquired during that period, and must, therefore, be spontaneous responses of certain organic feelings to outside stimuli. Man and beast start, then, practically on the same level—a life dependent on feeling.

But the difference between the two begins to manifest itself soon. The animal remains on the plane on which it started; man rises to a higher level. He grows into self-consciousness, because his feeling is differentiated into *intellect*, *will*, and *emotion*. We may describe *self-consciousness* as *the reaction of an organism which is aware of its unity, refers all its activities to itself, manifests itself through constant changes, and posits its identity through all these changes*. A self-conscious being must, therefore, be acting constantly just as any other living organism, since only through activity can he become aware of himself and of his identity. In the latent state, *e. g.*, in babies, self-consciousness is only potential, because we notice many interruptions of identity; and among adults there is a temporary suspension of the principal in-going and out-going activities during sleep, and thus a temporary loss of consciousness. We are not concerned with these conditions; our only point is that, normally, consciousness is identical through changes. How does the child grow into that state?

We have seen that already the unborn and the new-born child has organic sensations, some time before these can be noticed by the mother. These feelings—cold and warmth, hunger and thirst, muscular exertion, etc., give a psychical content to the child's life. They exist long before external objects are noticeable. With them the spontaneity of life begins to manifest itself. But as soon as the organs are suffi-

ently developed, activity extends. The babe moves his arms and legs; and he clings to his mother or nurse, because he feels the warmth. Sensations of numerous objects crowd in upon him, and some become gradually fixed; the mother and the nurse are distinguished by touch and by sight. He gazes helplessly at the different objects around him, but soon he learns to follow a light, to hear a sharp sound. Still, his mental attitude cannot be described in a better term than that of *chaos*. He simply lives in his environment. Perhaps the first distinction made is that of, There—here. This is probably the first exercise of an intellectual function, and experience adds to it daily. Curiosity is awakened, and brings about a desire to handle and use things. In this desire we have the elementary function of volition; the animal *ἐνθουσία* becomes differentiated and is directed by the awakening intellect. As soon as volition is exercised, feelings of *like and dislike* toward persons and things appear, and *emotions* become a specific function of the mind. With the increase of experience these different functions or properties of the mind become more and differentiated. The child grows into individuality through the differentiation of his feelings. How so?

We have indicated that feeling, as organic sensation, constitutes the only mental activity of the child, that physical activity proceeds from it spontaneously, and that such activity is a response to internal or external stimuli. We have seen, moreover, that the result of these reactions upon stimuli is the differentiation of his feeling into intellect, will, and emotion, and that he grows thus into an individual. But what have his emotions to do with the child's cognitions and volitions? And why should he grow into an individual because he feels himself such?

The child's volitions and cognitions are *his* because they have a warmth which those of no other men have for him. By means of this warmth he recognizes these ideas and acts as his own, and appropriates them. They thus belong to the one individual only, and never to another. The emotions serve, therefore, the purpose of appropriating acts and ideas by re-

ferring them to the consciousness of one individual. By numerous repetitions of this process the conception of *Me* is established, and the child knows himself as a person or an individual. Memory serves here as a connecting link between the past and the present; we appropriate those of our acts and thoughts of the past, which we remember. But memory must be accompanied by a feeling in order to connect the past and the present. We identify ourselves with our past because we remember that we had the same feelings concerning ourselves as to-day, and because this very memory is accompanied by a feeling of warmth. Whatever act or idea of the past is unable to evoke this reference to the *Me*, we consider as not belonging to us. If memory is to serve, then, as a principle of identification between the past and the present, it must contain this reference to the *Me* by means of a feeling. What happens, however, if memory fails altogether, as it does in the case of so-called double consciousness? The *Me* still remains, but it has a different content. A living being must act while conscious, and the acts done during the lapse of memory are now referred to the *Me*, and give it a new content. When memory returns, the former content of consciousness is referred to the *Me*. The case is similar to that of a dream not remembered, although more complex. The point is, that a *Me* consists of the reference to one consciousness of different activities by means of an appropriating emotion. The child grows, therefore, into the knowledge of a *Me* through feeling.

The function of the *Me* is essentially that of co-ordinating the different activities referred to it. For this purpose it must be completely organized, *i. e.*, feeling must have been thoroughly differentiated into intellect, will, and emotion. It is necessary, therefore, to show how this is done.

II. THE FUNCTION OF FEELING IN MAN.

The function of feeling in man may be considered under four heads. First, it is to be differentiated into intellect, will, and emotion. Second, it constitutes the principle of identity

through differences. Third, it lends charm to the individual and supplies a classification of men according to temperaments. Fourth, it is the source of ideals.

I. FEELING IS TO BE DIFFERENTIATED INTO INTELLECT,
WILL, AND EMOTION.

We have seen that in the undifferentiated state, *e. g.*, in animals and children, psychic life consists of feeling in its elementary form of sensation. We have also seen that the child grows into the knowledge of a Me through feeling. We must now show that feeling has to be differentiated in order to constitute a proper Me with the ability to co-ordinate different activities.

(1) *Feelings are convertible into cognitions.* It is a fact which everybody can observe for himself that strong emotions lose their intensity as soon as we reflect upon them. They are subdued by the mere fact of being reflected upon, and disappear if we continue thinking of them. How can we explain this? The only explanation we have is that the psychic energy employed in the emotion is converted into something else: it becomes thought, and is thus deflected from its previous course. No matter how angry we may be, we can stop our anger by turning the searchlight of reflection upon it, if we only persevere. And we can, similarly, reason ourselves out of an infatuation for a person or anything else. All we need to do is to reflect upon it and reason about it, because the more psychical energy we use up in thought, the less will be left for emotion to feed upon. In a well-balanced person this can usually be done with a little effort. In such a case we assume, of course, a fully-developed self-consciousness. But the problem is, how could feeling originally be converted into thought?

All sensations, whether centrally or peripherally excited, imply two things. They make us, first of all, aware of something; and this *awareness* may be, in the second place, either painful, pleasurable, or neutral. In either case, the sensation calls attention to itself. If the sensation attracts our attention

merely as something *there* or *here*, *red* or *white*, etc., it is an addition to our knowledge. But the very fact that a sensation makes us aware of something as *here* or *there*, as *red* or *white*, involves the power of discrimination on our part. Again, a sensation may attract our attention to something which is *crimson* or *maroon*, and then we have to exercise close discrimination in order to discover that the two colors are not the same, but *similar*. In order to make either a discrimination or find a similarity, we must have the power to recollect past impressions. But by means of these three powers, to discriminate between sensations, to find agreement between them, and to retain and recall them, the intellect builds up a rich and varied content out of sensations according to certain laws which do not interest us here any longer.

But all knowledge must be some individual's knowledge if it is to exist at all; and each sensation must, therefore, not only call attention to something, but must call *our*, *i. e.*, your or my, attention to that something. It must, in other words, be accompanied by a feeling; the sensation affects us, therefore, as painful, pleasurable, or indifferent. Any sensation which does not affect us in one of these three modes, cannot become part of our knowledge.

We may now take another step. The sensations which we have considered thus far, belong to the intellectual class, and they affect us, consequently, as neutral or indifferent. But there are other sensations which are of a more emotional type, because they are more or less distinctly painful or pleasurable. They, too, call attention to themselves, and usually in a very emphatic manner. But the very fact that they attract our attention, means that a part of the energy used in producing them is converted into cognition. Our pains and pleasures contribute, therefore, directly to our knowledge by being partly converted into cognition.

The reason why some sensations are of a more intellectual type, and others of a more emotional, may be found in the purpose of the organs in which they originate. Sensations which are localized in the end-organs put us into contact with the

outside world; while organic sensations are intended primarily to inform us about ourselves. Neither statement is exclusive, since externally excited sensations are frequently of a very pronounced emotional character, while those internally excited may be neutral. We may say, however, that, as a general rule, organic sensations have a marked emotional quality, while those of the end-organs are of a more intellectual character. The feeling aspect predominates in the former, the cognitive in the latter. In *taste* and *smell*, feeling and discrimination are about equally important. In sensations of *touch*, *hearing*, and especially *sight*, difference and agreement predominate. But no matter where a sensation originates, or what its primary character is, it must contain that quality of feeling, which refers it to the Me of one individual. Feeling always forms the innermost part, or the purely subjective side of every sensation, which is the absolute prerequisite to any conscious activity.

Feeling is, then, the source of knowledge, because it contains an element which is largely of an intellectual character; because it is often converted directly into thought; and because it supplies the intellectual elements, thus produced, with a reference to consciousness.

(2) *Feelings are convertible into volitions.* We have seen that a sensation, *e. g.*, of hunger, produces a state of restlessness and of "ill-at-ease." If intelligence is not sufficiently developed, this state creates merely an animal *ἐπιθυμία*, and produces random-activity through impulses, which may result in satisfying hunger. This spontaneous, impulsive, but random-activity often accomplishes the desired end. But it just as often misses it, especially among the lower animals, where this activity has more of an impulsive than an instinctive character. In order to become *will*, this activity must be guided by intelligence and not merely prompted by desire. The elementary will or *ἐπιθυμία* of the animal can never develop into anything higher, simply because animal intelligence hardly passes beyond the formation of associations. Will proper is, consequently, not found below man. It has two sources, one in the feelings, the other in the intellect.

Even in man the principal source of volitions is found in feelings. The organic and peripheral sensations produce feelings of pleasure or of pain. These are stored up in the memory, and by numerous repetitions man forms the conception that certain things are pleasurable and others painful. This impression is strengthened by the fact that pleasures are, on the whole, accompanied by an increase of energy and vitality; pains with a decrease of both.¹ This conception, constantly reinforced by feelings, leads to the devising of means and ways for the increase of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. When these are decided upon, the whole mental energy is enlisted in actions leading to the realization of the hoped-for pleasures. And this concentration of mental energy we call *will*. It is clear that this whole process is due to feelings, since part of the emotional energy was converted into intellectual force for the planning of means and ways, and another part into action, *i. e.*, volition, to attain the end. Every man knows how readily and strongly we concentrate our minds upon the achievement of pleasure, and how skilful we are in avoiding pain. The fact needs merely to be stated in order to be understood. This is the case especially with our elementary feelings which arise from organic sensations.

There is, however, another source of volitions, the intellect; although it, too, is closely connected with feeling. When I have formed a thought of some kind it is, of course, accompanied by a neutral, painful or pleasurable feeling. If it is indifferent, it is usually dropped, and does not influence me any further; if it is, however, painful or pleasurable, it will lead to an action of avoidance or seeking, as we have already seen.

Feeling is, then, convertible into will, because it supplies a spring to action.

(3) But *feelings are, moreover, convertible into emotions.*

It may seem as if we need say very little about this proposition. And still, one phase of our mental life can be explained

¹ We need not go into the physiological processes of these phenomena, since we are concerned only with the mental facts involved.

only if we distinguish between feeling and emotion. Under feeling we have so far understood principally sensations with a pleasure-pain quality. They have generally a strong physiological basis. Our feeling of hunger, and of comfort after a meal, of cold and warmth, of exhaustion, of fear and courage, even those of sensual love and hatred, can be explained on purely physiological grounds. But there are other feelings of a more pronounced mental character, which are not directly connected with the body. They contribute a large share to the richness of our mental life, and deserve, therefore, special mention. Without them our mental life would be very simple; it would be that of a child or of a savage,¹ "through whom we can see at once," because the spring of their actions and their reasoning is ascertained at a glance, since the whole mental attitude is controlled by the elementary feelings of pleasure and pain. We must, consequently, assume that cognitions and volitions react upon the bodily feelings, and thus give rise to the mental feelings, or emotions.

Every cognition introduces a new element into the mind. But it is, as we have seen, accompanied by a neutral feeling, and since the mind is a unity, a cognition must react upon the accompanying feeling, and thus give rise to an emotion. New cognitions affect us either as similar or dissimilar with the previous content of our consciousness, and the two emotions of harmony and discord are the result. They form the basis of all emotions connected with intellectual activity. The emotions are thus refined and gradually freed from the sensuous, and their field is greatly enlarged.

In a similar manner, volitions react upon the mental feelings by which they are accompanied. Every successful act produces, consequently, an emotion of satisfaction, and every act in which we have failed, one of dissatisfaction; and these two form the basis of the volitional emotions. It is thus that our successes and failures in their infinite variety of degrees between the extremes of "complete," again refine and enlarge the whole field of emotions.

¹The savage stands here for primitive man, who does not exist any longer. Savages now living have a more complex psychical life.

Feeling is, then, convertible into intellect, will and emotion. This conversion of psychical energy takes place normally, and explains the mental condition of the majority of mankind. But other reactions are possible after the psychical energy has once been differentiated and after the differentiation has become habitual. And these cases must now be considered.

(4) Cognitions are convertible into volitions, and the latter into the former.

Our cognitions may react more or less directly upon the will, and be accompanied only by the mental feelings, or by very feeble emotions. Two cases are possible here. If the material of the cognitions is the same without any, or with few, changes, they react upon the will, and produce continuous action on the same level. Thus we get the so-called routine work in our factories, offices, etc. The result is a lowering of the quality of the individual, which can be prevented and counteracted only by radical changes in the field of cognitions. The object of such changes is to present new material to the intellect, which will produce cognitions that react directly upon the feelings and thus enlist the interest of the individual by calling forth emotions.

If the material of the cognitions is constantly changing without producing strong or specific emotions and without reacting upon the will, we get the type of the "scatter-brained," with many but not permanent interests. This type is interesting, because people belonging to it have, as a rule, a large amount of information about things not worth knowing; their knowledge is superficial because they lack concentration to master the details and principles of what they see.

In the case of the reaction of will upon intellect we have two general types; the first is characterized by having these reactions accompanied with specific and strong emotions; the second by having but neutral or feeble emotions. Both types are creative; in the former class we have the poet, artist and musician; in the latter, the scholar, scientist and philosopher in the realm of knowledge, and the "Napoleon of finance," the great general, and the statesman in that of action. We get a combi-

nation of the two types in men like Plato and Emerson, whose writings are notable both for literary charm and instruction, and in men like Caesar and Frederick the Great, who were both writers and leaders of nations. In the latter type we must suppose strong and long-sustained emotions to accompany the reactions of the will upon intellect, a supposition easily justified by means of the close connection between feeling, as the original source of all action, and will, as the motive force to action enlightened by the intellect.

These different reactions between intellect, will and emotion give us a key to the complexity of the mental life of man. By means of them we get a glimpse of the manner in which the rich and varied life of civilization has developed from a few elementary feelings in the state of savagery. But the importance of the feelings in this stupendous progress is seen throughout, since only those cognitions are retained by man which have great interest or emotional value, and only those volitions and actions are likely to become permanent acquisitions through repetition, which produce a favorable emotion. The complexity of mental life depends, however, upon this differentiation of feeling into intellect, will and emotion.

2. FEELING CONSTITUTES THE PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY THROUGH DIFFERENCES.

A principle of identity in man must have three criteria. It must, in the first place, be permanent; in the second, be capable of being differentiated; and in the third, serve as a guide to well-being.

We have described self-consciousness as the reaction of a unity which refers all its activities to itself, manifests itself through constant changes, and is aware of its identity through all such changes. The mental life of man is infinitely complex on account of the numerous reactions and combinations of cognitions, volitions and emotions. What remains and abides in our consciousness as something always noticeable in one form or another? Two answers have been given to this question, that of the voluntarists and that of the intellectualists. The

former claim that the will is the principle of identity in all changes, and the latter that it is the intellect. Can either of these principles stand the test of the three criteria? I believe not.

Let us take *will* first. Is will the permanent element in our consciousness? There are many states of consciousness when I am not at all aware of a volition directed either inward or outward. Again, each man passes about one-third of his life in sleep, and he is not manifesting any will-power during that time, unless we give the term *will* a meaning which it has never had except in the philosophy of Schopenhauer; and in his philosophy will is a kind of *deus ex machina* who enters conveniently whenever needed to supply an explanation. Whatever may be thought of his philosophy from a metaphysical or theological point of view, as a psychological explanation the will does not serve as a principle of identity, because there are too many interruptions in its manifestations.

Neither can the will be differentiated into the other powers of the mind. It is possible to will to *know*, but it is impossible for us to will to *feel* in a certain way. Animals and small children have no will in the sense in which adults have it, and if feelings were dependent upon volitions, they would be without them. Nor does knowledge come to children through the exercise of the will, but through other agencies. In adults, cognitions are largely dependent upon volitions, because attention is focused upon a few objects which the individual has selected for that purpose. But feelings are, even in adults, almost entirely independent of volitions. We like and dislike instinctively, and many people never get over that stage. The voluntarists may argue that such cases often yield to a treatment of persuasion and better acquaintance, but that argument makes will dependent on intellect, and deprives it of its character as the primary power of the mind. Moreover, persuasion more often fails than it succeeds in its attempts to influence emotions, and the fact could be established by statistics if they were obtainable on such a delicate subject. The writer is led, at least, to entertain this opinion both from his own experience and

from that of his friends. And such failures occur where there is an honest attempt and even a desire to overcome an aversion towards a person who is estimable in every way. The will, then, cannot be converted into emotion, and cannot, consequently, be the principle of identity.

Similar objections may be urged against the intellectualistic theory. Man is not conscious of being always in the act of knowing. We know, indeed, that we *will* and *feel* when we are awake, but during sleep we are certainly not in a state of knowledge, and thus a large proportion of our lives does not contain the element of intellect. The latter cannot be said, therefore, to be a permanent principle in man. Nor does the intellect lend itself to differentiation. It furnishes material for both volitions and emotions, and may thus procure new avenues in which these powers are exercised; but it is never converted into either the one or the other, as can be clearly seen from the fact that the same information calls forth entirely different volitions or emotions in different individuals, or in the same individual at different times. In regard to instinctive likes and dislikes, the same objection may be urged as against the voluntaristic theory. In many individuals no amount of information will alter an aversion once established. Such actions are certainly not rational, but they are not on that account abnormal, because the numerous cases in which this aversion is in the end justified, prove that it is well founded. The truth of the intellectualistic theory is contained in what we have said about sensation as being to a certain extent a state of awareness or cognition.

Both the will and the intellect are, moreover, without a guide to well-being. Animals and children do not act rationally. But we constantly see them perform actions and functions which are conducive to their well-being. What guide have they in this matter? Reason is denied them, so that they cannot be led by intellect. The voluntarists say, the will. But the will is blind,¹ and cannot, therefore, lead to action which

¹ Cf. Johannes Volkelt, *Arthur Schopenhauer*, p. 147: "Der Wille ist dieses heftige, blinde, unermüdliche Triebwerk," etc.

will be beneficial in the end. If the intellectualists and voluntarists say, that it is instinct which prompts to such actions, we must answer that this is indeed the case, but that the instinct as a psychological function needs to be analyzed. They give up all hope of solving the question unless they introduce a *deus ex machina*, and that may, of course, be done on philosophical grounds, if that kind of philosophy should prove satisfactory. But we cannot do that in psychology, since we must not go beyond the organism for an explanation of its functions, and must, consequently, suppose each living being to be sufficiently equipped with a guide in its actions. If this guide cannot be found in the will or the intellect, we must look somewhere else for it, *i. e.*, in feeling.

Does feeling serve as a principle of identity? Can it be tested by the three criteria we have given? I believe these questions can be answered in the affirmative.

So much has been said about the differentiation of feeling into intellect, will, and emotion, that nothing more need be said here. We have, then, the other two tests left, permanency of manifestation and guidance to well-being.

The feelings are a permanent constituent of our consciousness.

Every state of our consciousness is accompanied by a feeling. The latter may not be strong, but it is there. We call these feelings *neutral*, because they are not of a sufficiently emotional nature to be classed with the emotions proper. They simply *refer* the state of consciousness, of whatever nature, to the Me. Thus every intellectual state is accompanied by an intellectual feeling, and every volitional state by a volitional feeling. If the emotional nature of an intellectual or volitional state is more strongly marked, we have, according to Wundt,¹ logical feelings, *e. g.*, of harmony or contradiction, of truth or untruth; the volitional feelings of success or failure; the ethical feelings of exaltation and depression; the religious feelings, and the aesthetic feelings. All these feelings are of a highly

¹ *Physiologische Psychologie*, II., pp. 424 ff. of third edition.

complex character, and arise through various and numerous interactions of intellect, will, and emotion. The only point to be emphasized here is that any mental state is accompanied by at least a neutral feeling, if not by a specific emotion, and this feeling refers every respective state of consciousness to the Me, and thus establishes the identity of the latter through all changes of our consciousness.

Feeling is, however, not only a permanent element of our consciousness when we are awake, but also when we are asleep. I do not mean the half-awake state of dream, but that of sound and refreshing dreamless sleep. We are, of course, unconscious of these feelings, just as we are generally when awake. I mean the organic feelings. They continue all through sleep and produce certain adjustments of the body all unbeknown to us. Almost every man has found himself in a different position in the morning, even after a refreshing and dreamless sleep, from the one he took up when he lost consciousness the night before. Evidently some action must have taken place to account for this change. The action was neither willed nor planned; the will and the intellect had, therefore, no part in it. The only way to account for it is by assuming that the organic feelings continue, and produce the changes which are necessary for our comfort. If this assumption is correct, we may understand why I always connect the consciousness of myself in the morning with the consciousness of myself the night before. There has really been no interruption in that element of our mental nature which forms the basis of all others, since feeling has been going on without our knowledge or volition. These feelings are naturally of a simple and rudimentary character, but they are sufficient to maintain an uninterrupted connection in our mental and physical life; and that is the only purpose they are to serve, from this point of view. By referring every change in the periphery or within the body to the brain, they call forth those nervous discharges which bring about the necessary adjustments. If some one would prefer to say that these changes are produced in a purely mechanical way by the nervous system and the brain, I have no

objection, so long as it is admitted that organic feelings are the cause which sets this machinery in motion.

The feelings are thus a permanent element in our consciousness and in our mental nature.

But they are, furthermore, a guide to well-being. Actions which tend toward the furtherance of life are, on the whole, accompanied by pleasurable feelings, and those which have a contrary effect, by painful feelings. Animals and children follow this law naturally, and adults intentionally. This law is quite sufficient to serve as a competent guide to action, if it is not deliberately supplanted by a different law, as in the case of moral action. The pangs of hunger compel the organism to search for food, and the consumption of the latter produces pleasure. The feeling of vigor induces to play or work when the question of food would produce no action; and the feeling of pleasurable strain in a matured organism to sexual intercourse, unless higher laws forbid, as in civilized society. Animals, children, and uncivilized man follow this guide of pleasure and pain, and it is as a rule a competent guide, since they thrive under it, at least physically. Where the intellect and the will are not sufficiently developed, feeling is the only guide to well-being. But even in the life of civilized man it has a large function, as may be seen from the system of punishment and reward applied both in school and in all spheres of industrial, political, and social life.

In the higher walks of life men follow the same law, although the latter is here modified by numerous influences of the will and of the intellect. Take the case of the artist, whether he be painter, sculptor, composer or literary writer. Each one creates something new primarily for the pleasure it gives him and others, and unless their creations fulfill this function they are considered failures. Take again the man of science and the philosopher. In their inventions, discoveries and the creating of systems, they are led by feeling, although their work is primarily intellectual and intended for the intellect. When the difficulties seem stupendous and the solutions impossible, it is the feeling of the possibility of success which inspires courage

and steels the will to press on toward the coveted goal. The will is directed upon the problem, and the activity focused on the difficulties only as long as there is a hope, *i. e.*, an emotion of ultimately triumphing over them; when this feeling disappears, effort ceases immediately. Even so pronounced a voluntarist as Wundt admits that. Speaking about success and failure, he says: "In einem Stadium des Denkens, in welchem wir durchaus noch nicht im Stande sind die logischen Beweismittel für ein intellectuelles Resultat mit Sicherheit aufzuzeigen, wird dieses letztere in der Regel schon von dem Gefühl vorausgenommen. In diesem Sinn ist das Gefühl der Pionier der Erkenntnis. Auf ihm beruht jener logische Takt des praktischen Menschenverstandes wie des wissenschaftlichen Denkens, welcher dem Instinct so verwandt scheint."¹ The will and the intellect play a large rôle in all the higher mental activities; the former acts as a fly-wheel in tiding us over those numerous dead points when habit and pleasure cease to be sufficient motive forces; the latter supplies the mind with new ideas which keep it from becoming sterile and stereotyped. Still, we act generally from habit, which, because of its almost automatic character, makes our daily routine work easy and, therefore, slightly pleasurable; and from a feeling either to avoid a painful emotion or to attain a pleasant one.

Both the intellectualistic and the voluntaristic theories fail to explain the whole of man's consciousness, and they fail, consequently, as a principle of identity. For what Goethe says of the intellect, applies with equal force to the will: "The sum of our existence, divided by reason, never comes out exact, but always leaves a marvellous remainder."² Feeling alone can serve as a principle of identity, because it is permanent in its manifestation, supplies a guide to well-being, and can be differ-

¹ *Physiologische Psychologie*, II, p. 424 of third edition.

² W. Meister's *Wanderjahre*, IV, 18, Quoted by Wallace "*Philosophy of Mind*" [Hegel], p. clv. There is certainly a mistake about the place of the quotation, since the "*Wanderjahre*" has only three books. The corresponding book and chapter in the "*Lehrjahre*" do not contain the passage.

entiated into intellect, will, and emotion. We may act in different ways, think of thousands of objects, have any kind of emotions, change in every possible way as the years go by, but the feeling of our *Me* abideth through all changes. "Amid the variations of composite and varying reality, the most fixed point of reference is now seen to be the feeling of *self*."¹ "For this central part of the Self is *felt*."²

3. FEELING GIVES CHARM TO THE INDIVIDUAL, AND SUPPLIES
A MEANS BY WHICH TO CLASSIFY MEN ACCORDING
TO TEMPERAMENT.

A. Feeling gives charm to the individual.

Why are some people so irresistibly attractive, and others so intolerably dull, or even repulsive? Many answers are given in reply to this question, but they are never satisfactory, because they are based either on a voluntaristic or an intellectualistic conception of man. A Mephistopheles combines both great powers of will and of intellect, and he should be the most attractive person known in literature, if these two theories were right. But he is not. Faust himself, whom he constantly helps and to whom he is absolutely necessary for the carrying out of great plans, abhors him. Goethe felt that he must endow this character with certain emotional tendencies in order to make him endurable. Nor is it different in actual life. Napoleon the Great has many admirers (from a distance), because of his keen intellect and indomitable will; but few sincere friends, because of his lack of positive emotions. And it is positive emotions which we have in mind here, for every human being must have emotions of some kind. The positive emotions attract because they are social; the negative repel, because they are self-centered, and generally well under control, and this gives the impression as if they were absent altogether. The cold, shrewd and determined man of business is seldom an attractive character. There seems to be something *unhuman*

¹ J. M. Baldwin, "*Handbook of Psychology, Feeling, and Will*," p. 170.

² W. James, "*The Principles of Psychology*," I, p. 298. [Italics theirs.]

about persons endowed with great power of will and of intellect, but lacking in emotional qualities. They fill us with fear and with awe. When these two powers exist in a person to a lesser degree, we are not repelled, but bored, because such people are usually dull and uninteresting. And still, both of these classes act and reason correctly; they are, at least may be, good people in every respect, deport themselves properly in all relations and conditions of life. There are some people whom we must condemn because of their lack of will power and inexcusable ignorance, but whom we, nevertheless, like on account of their strong and variable emotions. Children are generally attractive, since they are strongly emotional; we love them for their odd statements, since the latter are spontaneous, *i. e.*, not reasoned out, but immediate expressions of an emotion. Given equal volitional and intellectual, but unequal emotional powers in different individuals, we invariably prefer the one with more and stronger emotions. The person in whom an idea calls forth only an intellectual reaction, is cold; while the individual with an intellectual plus an emotional reaction is attractive, because we come here into immediate touch with the core of individuality, since the reaction is not of a general type, but specific. Two persons may have the same knowledge and the same volitions, and still be totally different, because the one reacts only volitionally and intellectually, while the other reacts at the same time emotionally. The difference between the mere scholar and the creative person is to be found here. The former accumulates a large amount of information by close application to his task; the latter, with perhaps considerably less information, creates something new because he gives all acquired information the impress of his own individuality by reacting upon it emotionally. The fact that we listen spell-bound to a comparatively ignorant man, while he constantly jars our sense of proportion and of grammatical fitness, can be explained only on the theory that what little information he possesses has received the stamp of his own individuality through the emotions. We admit that Professor Dryasdust reasons logically, speaks grammatic-

ally, has some new information to impart; but we soon find some excuse to depart from his learned presence, or, if that is not feasible, some way of turning the leaves of the latest novel noiselessly and expectantly.¹

The arts owe their vitality, perhaps their very existence, to their power to call forth emotions. A picture which does not evoke an aesthetic emotion fails of its mission, either because it is incapable of doing so, or because the beholder has no sense of the beautiful. Homer and Shakespeare will never lose their power of attraction, since both bring before us men and women who hate and love with all their might, and can, therefore, call forth similar emotions in us. The problem-novel of to-day will soon find its place in suitable retirement on the book-shelves of some antiquarian, side by side with the learned tomes of past centuries, whose pig-skin bindings are now deemed of greater value than their scholarly contents. And why? Because both the problem-novel and the learned tome impart principally information; but knowledge is constantly growing and expanding, and thus the text-book of to-day will be old to-morrow. It will then have an interest only for the specialist and the historian.

There are, however, a few books which have not, and perhaps never will grow old, although they are primarily intended for information. The Dialogues of Plato, the writings of Marcus Aurelius, and the Essays of Emerson, belong to this class. But while these books convey instruction chiefly, they have at the same time a literary value, since a constant, although restrained emotional element is noticeable throughout.

It may be well to notice in this connection how we obtain our knowledge in the more advanced stages. Adults who are no longer under compulsion in regard to what they have to study, select those subjects which interest them. But *interest* is an emotional element of our mind; and we apply ourselves diligently only to the acquirement of such knowledge which

¹ Man can certainly not be charming without emotions; it does not follow, however, that a man with emotions is charming; it depends, as we have seen, on the kind of emotions.

has an emotional value for us. The more associations we have formed with a subject, the greater our interest in it, and the better we like it. As mere information the report of the discovery of a manuscript from the classical period of Greece has exactly the same value for the mathematician as for the student of Greek literature. But how differently this report affects the two men! The former receives the news with indifference; the latter with the keenest possible interest. How little it means to the mathematician, and how much to the classicist! The former is done with it as soon as he has read it; before the latter arise visions of a treatise to be written, a possible promotion following the treatise, and, if he be a bachelor and engaged to a nice young woman, a home of his own with his beloved as the presiding goddess. But let the manuscript be a treatise on geometry by Euclid. How differently it will affect the mathematician? This is simply an illustration of what happens constantly in the life of everybody. Knowledge as such has little or no value for us unless it can arouse our interest through association. Whether a cognition is valuable to *me* and to *you* depends on its power to affect our emotions.

B. Feeling Supplies a Means of Classifying Men According to Temperaments.

Since feeling is the original psychical energy, it seems but natural that the only half-way satisfactory principle of classifying men in regard to their mental disposition has been found in the emotions, and the four temperaments are based entirely on the former. This classification may not be satisfactory; but it is a significant fact that no other principle has been discovered since the time of Galen, notwithstanding the tremendous development of psychological theories. If I venture, nevertheless, to suggest a new classification, it is because I think that a greater approach to the actual mental dispositions as a whole and to the stages in the development of the individual and of the race can be made, than was done by Galen's division. If our description of the development of the mind is correct, we have four stages: the comparatively undifferentiated or the

emotional; the emotional-volitional, whose characteristic is practical activity; the emotional-intellectual, whose activity is creative; and the volitional-intellectual, whose activity is constant, but at the expense of the individuality.

In the first class we should place savages and barbarians, children in civilization up to the fourth or fifth year, the volatile minds which are well-informed but not balanced. Their activity is great, but it is neither constant nor properly directed. Their actions are impulsive, and often explosive. In the second class we should place the nomads, semi-civilized people, and those persons in civilized countries whose activity is calculated to produce the comforts of life and to enjoy them; they care little for the cultivation of their minds except so far as it contributes to the net profit in business, society, or to their enjoyment; in short, "the Philistines" form the larger part of this class. In the third class we should place the creative minds who invent, discover and create systems of science and philosophy, form new combinations in business and politics, and, above all, the true artists of different kinds. They aim at self-development and self-expression. A free and full individuality is their goal, not in themselves only, but in others. They are the leaders and benefactors of mankind. In the fourth class belong those people who mark the decline of a high civilization because they are its victims. Two extremes form this class: the shrewd, hard-hearted man of business, whose only object is to accumulate millions, and who uses the great opportunities of a high civilization for this purpose only; and his laborers, who are compelled to work from twelve to sixteen hours a day in unsanitary surroundings for starvation wages, and who have, consequently, neither the time nor the inclination to develop their faculties. Expressed in terms of economics, the first class produces just as much as is necessary to maintain life; the second produces not only the necessities, but also the comforts of life in order to enjoy them; the third produces the comforts and luxuries of life as a means to develop the mind; the fourth class likewise produces both the comforts and the luxuries of life without being able to enjoy them; the

miser, because he has lost the faculty of enjoying anything; the laborer, because he cannot get them, and would, perhaps, not know how to use them rationally. The names *emotional*, *practical*, *creative* and *pessimistic*, might be suggested for the different classes of mental dispositions, since they are already in use, and easily understood. If we take the emotions as a key of the mental attitude towards life, we find that the emotional temperament is hopeful, since there is but little apprehension of future events, owing to low intellectual development; the practical is serene and cheerful, owing to results already accomplished and to confidence in its own powers to cope with future difficulties; the creative is strongly optimistic, but on grounds rather of belief than of reason; the pessimistic apprehends the evils and sorrows of life chiefly, and is, consequently, gloomy and cheerless. In the first, the emotions, both negative and positive, reign supreme; in the second, both are well under the control of the will; in the third, they are numerous, well balanced by intellectual and volitional powers and predominantly positive; in the fourth, they are of few kinds, but continuous, and of a negative character.

4. FEELING IS THE SOURCE OF IDEALS.

The spring of activity in the undifferentiated psychical state is feeling. As soon as feeling has been differentiated into intellect, will, and emotion, the possibilities of an ideal of self-realization are given. *Self-realization* we have defined¹ as *the harmonious development of all faculties to the greatest possible extent*. We indicated² that the activity of the individual is necessary in this process, and that all the faculties of mind play a part in it. We must now expand that argument. Our endeavor has been all along to show that activity proceeds from feeling in animals, and in the case of man from interest; but both of these springs are emotional in character.

The great leap from the actual to the ideal is made by means of the memory, and the latter depends on the modifications

¹ P., 5 *supra*.

² Pp. 6-7.

which the original act has made on the nerves, the muscles, and the brain, and on the possibility of their revival either through central or peripheral excitation. As soon as the memory is fairly continuous, we have the medium of recalling past happenings. We will naturally dwell more fondly on the experiences which were pleasant, and avoid recalling those that were painful, unless they force themselves upon us. By dwelling upon past pleasures, the desire arises to have more of them, and we find ourselves planning how to get them. When we have laid our plan, our energy is centered on its realization. And before long we obtain what we have striven for. If our memory brings back to consciousness a painful experience, we simply endeavor to keep away anything that will give us new pain. This is the rationale of action in all unsophisticated people. Pleasures excite to action in the direction of attainment, pains in that of avoidance. But man lives in the society of other men, and he cannot follow out his inclinations without restriction, even if the means were at his disposal. If the inclinations are strong—and they usually are—a conflict is the inevitable result. He either prefers to satisfy his desire, and makes no progress, or his love for those who impose the restriction prevails, and he commits his first moral act. The conflict is thus really in his own mind, and is a conflict between two emotions, the pleasure he may get from satisfying his inclination, and the pleasure resulting from giving pleasure to those he loves. By the repetition of this process—assisted, perhaps, by occasional punishments—the individual learns to conceive of himself as a dual being, the one existing for himself only and satisfying his own proclivities, the other existing for others and giving pleasure to them; or, in terms of ethics, he looks at himself as the being which he *is*, and the being which he *ought* to be. Thus a moral ideal is established. It has its origin in the emotions, its conception in the intellect, and its enforcement in the will. For he must determine once for all, to act in accordance with this standard, if the idea is to become a reality. And this resolution is absolutely necessary in order to carry him over those numerous dead points where

the pleasure given to others is not sufficient to balance the pleasure he himself would receive by satisfying his inclinations. But one point is to be remembered in this connection. This self-denial, or the preference of a higher to a lower motive, must become easier and less painful by repetition and habit; it must eventually become a pleasure in itself, since no human being could endure the strain and friction of continuous moral action in the austere and rigorous sense of Kant. For this ideal is of a negative character.

There is, however, a higher ideal than this. Through the growth of the intellect, the individual soon learns that there are a large number of desires, powers and proclivities which it is commendable to gratify and develop, and the exercise of which will give pleasure not only to himself but to others. He conceives a picture of himself as he would be in that condition, and he applies all his energy to reach that goal. In this process he becomes aware of himself as a *whole*, as an integral unit. He learns that what he is really striving for is not the satisfaction of this or that desire, this or that faculty, but of all his powers, physical, mental and moral. And this can be done only by the harmonious and proportionate development of his different faculties. As soon as he has reached this stage of knowledge, he determines to direct his energies toward the attainment of this one great object of his life—to realize himself.

Two things are necessary if the individual is to realize himself: he must differentiate himself, and he must enter into communion with other self-conscious beings. A factory hand who sees the same things, performs the same acts and thinks practically the same thoughts day after day, and year after year, has little chance of becoming a complete individual, because too many of his powers are not exercised for lack of opportunity. What he does, sees and hears arouses no interest, because it calls forth reactions of the cognitions upon volitions only. If individuality is to grow and expand, there must be not only numerous, but various cognitions. The most natural course is by change of occupation, and of environment through travel, etc. But if for some reason this is not possible, the

individual who wants to realize himself determines to seek opportunities. If they are not forthcoming, he creates them. And so he enters into various spheres of life, which have no connection with his special work, and for which, at first, he has no particular liking; since he does not wish to depend for his development on the whim of his emotions. After some training of this kind under the will, the emotions soon begin to respond readily, and the disagreeable task becomes a pleasure.¹ The individual thus creates his own environment in the true sense of the word. To what extent such an environment can be created may be seen from the example of Kant and Schiller; for although neither knew much of the actual world through travel, still both influenced their contemporaries and posterity to a very large degree. The former gave us his keen analysis of the intellectual and moral faculties, and the latter described scenes of Italy and Switzerland more vividly and accurately than many who had seen them. How fatal the restriction of the mental environment is, we may see from the example of some scientists and theologians who refuse to be interested in anything but their own specialty or inherited doctrines. Narrowness and fossilization are the inevitable result; truth, progress and righteousness suffer.

The individual who seeks self-realization acts differently. His environment is constantly expanding, because his interests are growing in number and intensity. Thus he encompasses the whole world, since he relates it to himself and identifies it with himself. The past, the present, the future, the universe itself are his, as they become a part of his consciousness. He thus creates his own world; and that world has unity, because he is a unity. He is sole ruler in this world, is not determined by it, but controls and governs it. As he proceeds to differentiate himself continually, only to find his own identity

¹ What is said here does not contradict what was said above, p. 35, since there we spoke of a strong instinctive dislike which even a strong man hardly ever overcomes; here we have in mind a dislike which is less pronounced, and refers more to some quality in the individual, *e. g.*, laziness. This can certainly be overcome.

through differences, as he constantly turns particulars into universals by relating them to himself, his sense of mastership grows upon him, and he acknowledges only one above himself—God. He experiences then that supreme satisfaction which comes only to him who feels and knows that he has realized himself.

The rôle of the emotions in this process is constant, if not predominant. The intellect furnishes the means, and the will determines the goal of self-realization. But what happens when the intellect is puzzled by perplexities, and the will baffled by obstructions? For numerous difficulties stand in the way of self-realization. His consciousness is, of course, a unity; but the objective world appears to be a muddle of contradictions without meaning. He cannot say, it *shall* be a unity, since he knows that facts are stubborn and do not obey the behests of any man; neither can he say it *is* a unity, for it is a chaos of inconsistencies and contradictions as it actually appears to his intellect. Where is the Ariadne to furnish him a thread by which he may find his way through this labyrinth? He must have it, lest he perish! Feeling is the Ariadne. Puzzled and baffled, man still has the emotion of hope and faith that some way may be found out of the labyrinth. And this feeling impels him to continue the struggle, to search for new knowledge, and to determine that he shall, at least, approach the goal. In this struggle every cognition, every volition, and every emotion becomes a new determination of himself, since it influences his whole being. He thus grows into fuller knowledge of himself, as he gets a larger knowledge of the objective world; and as he grows, his faith and hope grow with him. Through the new conquests which he makes in the objective and in the subjective world he learns that the former is as much a unity as the latter, although he may never be able to verify the fact. But the feeling of faith and hope that ultimately this problem, too, will be solved, inspires him with courage and determination to continue the struggle against the apparently invincible antagonist. And in this struggle he finds his self-realization as a civilized man. For

the difference between the ignorant savage who looks at the world in hopeless bewilderment, and the half-educated pessimist who is crushed by the evidences of disorder and of cruelty in the world-process, on the one hand, and the truly civilized man who never loses heart in the face of all difficulties, on the other, consists in just this, that the former two are not at complete unity with themselves, while the latter is. The savage lacks intellectual, and the pessimist moral unity, but the harmoniously developed man is at complete unity with himself, and this fact is sufficient evidence to him that the objective world is likewise a unity. He is as little in possession of the key to unlock all the gates of knowledge as the other two, but he has unlocked at least one of these gates, that of his own consciousness. The other two are bewildered and despair; he hopes and believes. He is, consequently, the truly civilized man, since he is at one with himself, and finds his self-realization in and through the consciousness of his unity.

Man must, however, enter into communion with other men in order to realize himself. "Das Selbstbewusstseyn erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem andern Selbstbewusstseyn."¹ Extreme individualists² claim, indeed, that each man is sufficient unto himself, and needs no one else in order to develop his powers harmoniously. The few examples of men who were deprived of human society and did hardly rise above the level of an animal, seem to leave this theory no foundation. But examples might be quoted to prove that men in society did not develop either, and the case *pro et contra*, one theory or the other, would thus be at about the same point from which it started. But it only seems so if a few cases on one side are allowed to balance thousands of cases on the other. Still, the question may be argued from a different point of view, that of our own consciousness. This will form the subject-matter of the second part of this thesis; it had to be mentioned here in order to complete the topic of self-realization.

¹ Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 134, 2d edition, Berlin, 1841.

² Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt in "*Ideen zu einen Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen.*" Complete works, vol. 7, pp. 14 and 15.

We have tried to prove that man reached self-consciousness through feeling, by pointing out that feeling is the only psychical energy which the animal and the undeveloped man have, and that the emotions, both specific and neutral, are necessary in this process, because the former supply the motive force to action, and the latter refer all activities to the one individual consciousness, and thus create the Me by means of the memory. We have also tried to show that the function of feeling in man is of four kinds; it is to be differentiated into will, intellect, and emotion, and thus furnish the means of a *complex* mental life; it constitutes the principle of identity through differences, since it is permanent in its action, convertible into the other mental powers, and furnishes a guide to well-being; it explains why some people are attractive and others are not, and gives us a classification of mental dispositions according to the *temperaments*; it is, lastly, the source of ideals and of self-realization.

Men differ, however, from animals by having a co-ordinated Me, and by knowing their identity through differences; from each other, in the complexity and richness of their mental life, in the force and direction of their activity, in the power of attraction upon others, and, finally, in the degree to which they realize themselves. But all these differences we have found to be traceable, and, generally, directly due to feeling. The inference seems reasonable, then, that *Feeling is the Principle of Individuation*.

B. FEELING AS THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIALIZATION.

In order to bring out this point properly, we shall have to treat:

- I. Of the sources of sociality.
- II. Of the rise and function of the individuating and of the social Me in man.

I. SOURCES OF SOCIALITY.

Our principal object is to discuss sociality among men; but some of the causes of sociality have their roots in the psychic life of animals, *i. e.*, in purely natural conditions; other and more important causes have their origin in the mental life peculiar to man. It will be necessary, consequently, to consider

1. The sources of sociality among animals.

We have defined consciousness as the reaction of an organism upon a stimulus. If sociality means living together and co-operation toward common ends, whether instinctive or intentional, there must be similar reactions of different organisms to the same stimulus, since co-operation is possible only on such a basis; otherwise, we should have conditions similar to the "confusion of tongues" at Babel. We may, then, tentatively define *sociality as similar reaction of several organisms to the same stimulus*. I use the word *similar* advisedly, since the reactions cannot be the *same* for two reasons: There are no two organisms exactly alike, and their reactions can, consequently, not be the same, even if considered objectively; again, the object of society is progress through effort, but progress could never come about except through differences in reactions. The latter must be sufficiently alike to ensure co-operation toward the same ends; they must be sufficiently unlike to admit of variation, and, therefore, of progress. The latter is impossible

in the inorganic realm, because reaction is always proportionate to the momentum, *i. e.*, mass and velocity; and the only changes which occur are those of location through the attraction of the larger upon the smaller mass. The question is, then, how did sociality arise, or how did similar reactions originate in different organisms?

We propose *feeling* as a principle of socialization.

Life and original variations must be taken for granted by psychology and by psycho-sociology, since it is not the object of either of these sciences to become a philosophy of *origins*, but simply to explain psychological and psycho-sociological phenomena, respectively. "No two individuals are born with equal endowments of strength and vitality. No two attain the same weight and stature. No two have the same suppleness of body, the same amount of energy, or the same desire for physical activity."¹ These variations are organic, and they form the *terminus a quo* of psycho-sociology. But with variations there are given, at the same time, conflicts. And the question arises, how are the actions of the individual accommodated to those of other individuals, so that there shall be similar, instead of different, reactions to the same stimulus? Or, since external action is merely an expression of a psychical state, what subjective conditions are necessary in order to turn conflict into co-operation? The latter question is more particularly the one with which we are concerned, since a successful sociology can only be founded on a true psychology of the individual. We can never understand the so-called social actions of the individual until we know what his motives to action are, when the latter concerns only himself. We found in the first part of this discussion that feeling is the only spring to action among animals. Let us now see whether this principle can be applied to social actions. And let us bear in mind that we are concerned chiefly with the motive, the spring, the psychological condition of action, and not with the modes in which it finds expression.

If two protozoa of the same species meet by accident, we may

¹ F. H. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 47.

assume that their contact results in something akin to pleasure. This assumption reaches a high degree of probability when we remember that fecundation among these animalcules can be brought about only by an accidental meeting. Even if we admit a primitive sense of sight, the seeking of a partner must be principally by touch. When they meet for the purpose of fecundation, they are undoubtedly in a state of pleasurable excitement, otherwise we could never understand their behavior as described by Balbiani.¹ Here we have two different situations of two organisms, and a similar reaction resulting in pleasure. These movements will be repeated, because a rudimentary memory is being established according to the law that pleasure tends toward furtherance of life. Objective kinship or similarity thus results in subjective kinship, *i. e.*, the establishing of sociality. Such meetings we may consider as the first source of sociality.

Let us, in the second place, suppose that two protozoa, *A* and *B*, thus already acquainted, meet an animalcule not of their species, a common foe, called *X*. What happens? Four cases are possible: (1) both take to flight in the same direction; (2) both flee, but in different directions; (3) *A* attacks, *B* flees; (4) both *A* and *B* attack. In case No. 1 the feeling of relief will strengthen the fellowship already established, since the same stimulus produced similar reactions and pleasures. In case No. 2, *A* and *B* react similarly, but there is no furtherance of fellowship, perhaps breaking off thereof. In case No. 3 the different reaction results most probably in the breaking off of fellowship. In case No. 4 the similar reaction to the same stimulus and the relief over the driving off of the enemy, will result in a similar subjective state of pleasure, and will, consequently, strengthen the fellowship.

The chances are, then, even for the furtherance of fellowship, abstractly considered. Practically they are more than even; since if both flee, the probabilities are that they will flee in the same direction, because, moving, as they do, in the same direc-

¹ Cf. pp. 16 and 17 *supra*, and A. Binet, "*The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*," p. 67.

tion, their momentum will either carry them on as in case No. 4; or, if they change their movement, both will change it in the same direction, on account of their propinquity and the rudimentary character of their organs of locomotion, which enables them to move more easily backward or forward than towards one side. Either backward or forward movement will, consequently, be in the line of least resistance, and thus the chances of furthering the fellowship are increased.

There is, however, a third source of sociality. Let us suppose case No. 3 as above. *A* goes ahead and drives off the enemy *X*, while *B* flees; and let us further suppose that *A* and *B* belong to a class of animals which are able to form associations, and that they recognize each other when they meet again after the struggle. They continue to live together, and derive pleasure from each other's company by touch and fecundation. After a time they meet a common foe *Y*; the tendency of *A* will be to react in the same way as before, *i. e.*, to attack, as he did when he met *X*; that of *B* to flee. But another tendency has meanwhile been established in *B*, to keep in *A*'s company. When they met *X*, this tendency was not strong enough to keep *B* from flight, but in the interval it has been sufficiently strengthened to do so. Both continue their movement, attack, and drive off *Y*. The resulting feeling of relief will greatly strengthen their fellowship. And justly so, since we have here a truly social act, because an act done by overcoming an individual tendency through the power of pleasure based on previous association.

There is, finally, another source of sociality. Thus far we have supposed the first meeting to have been accidental. But more emphasis must be laid on the inner forces of life than some evolutionists do. Life is activity, and it is *felt* activity. Considered only in its individual relations, the animal acts in order to relieve the inner strain of hunger. But if this activity is properly performed and if every organ is in good order, the organism will mature, and purely individual wants will impel the animal to perform the social act of fecundation. Since animals act only according to social impulses and instincts, and

are, consequently, ignorant of the result of their acts, coition and fecundation must be done to relieve the feeling of stress of a matured organism. The early occurrence of fecundation seems to indicate that the stress must be felt even by the protozoa. This gives us a positive principle of sociality—the seeking of a companion for purely individual needs. *The matured organism points beyond itself for its own well-being and completion.*

This instinct is operative all through the animal kingdom. It can be depended on to act at regular intervals. It produces, more than any other action not planned by an intelligent being, similar reaction to the same stimulus. It is, therefore, an eminently social act. While it does not operate continuously, this instinct produces social results at least for the time being. All the different forms of courtship preceding coition are the direct result of this instinct. Family life, however low and degraded, is another of its results. The important point for us is, that the animal, in order to gratify this purely individual and pleasurable instinct, must seek the companionship of his own kind, and perform social acts both before and after coition.

In all these sources of sociality, feeling is at the bottom of activity, both at the beginning and during the continuation. It lasts only as long as the feeling lasts. When hunger is satisfied, activity ceases; when companionship fails to yield any more pleasure, the animals separate. Sociality is irregular and spasmodic, because it depends on feeling alone. The parents will eat their own offspring when the feeling of hunger prevails over the feeling of pleasure derived from the latter's company. The members of a herd will fight unto death if anger gains predominance over pleasure. But whatever sociality exists among animals, is based on feeling, more particularly on that of pleasure. In order to act regularly and systematically as a principle of socialization, feeling must be differentiated, as in the case of man.

2. Sources of sociality among men.

We have the purely animal kind of sociality among men of low mental development. Savages and children act principally

from this motive when they act socially. The result is that sociality is occasional and spasmodic. A truly social act rests on obligation. This must become habitual, in order to assure regular action with the least possible friction. Habitual actions are, however, pleasurable; perhaps not keenly so, but to a moderate degree. We become strongly aware of this pleasure when we are deprived of it through some cause, even if we should fail to notice it clearly at the time. And this is what we might expect, since no human being could stand the strain of continued moral action, in the rigorous sense of Kant, for any length of time. Not only our health and comfort, but the progress and welfare of mankind would suffer. That these actions are habitual and more or less pleasurable does not interfere with their character as ethical, since they can be tested by the criteria both of motive and of result. And even if it should be found by analysis that they have lost their character of obligation in the consciousness of the individual, we must remember that they were originally based on that principle, and that a more or less continued war had to be waged until the obligatory action became habitual. It is not in the interest either of ethical science or of individual and social welfare that there should be many prolonged moral conflicts. But it is decidedly to the advantage, both of society and of the individual, that the conflicts which do arise should be settled as quickly as possible by having the obligatory action become habitual. That does not mean moral stagnation, since the continued differentiation of man's mind is a constant source of new situations in which the moral and social sense of the individual is being tested anew all the time. Sociality among men rests, then, on obligation. If this position is correct, we may define it as *the intentional similar reaction of several organisms to the same stimulus*.

How does the child grow into this state of sociality? We distinguish three periods in the growth of a child from the social point of view; the period of indifference, lasting, perhaps, over a year; that of authority, when he is taught by precept and is made to conform to certain requirements; that

of freedom, when he is left to determine for himself what to do. These periods are marked roughly by the inner growth of his *intellect* from vagueness through dualism to unity, of the *will* from chaos through conflict to conquest, of the *emotions* from neutrality through discord to harmony. During the period of indifference but little can be done for the social education of the child, because reactions are largely fitful and uncontrollable. As soon, however, as the mind is in the state of differentiation, social education sets in. The object of education during the period of authority is, to assist the child in connecting his cognitions, volitions, and emotions into a co-ordinating Me by means of an externally imposed standard. The parents, sisters, brothers, playmates, the school, etc., are the external agencies in this process. By numerous orders and commands—accompanied with reward and punishment, if need be—the child learns that there are certain lines within which he may move freely, but which he must not cross. Thus he learns to know himself as a dual being, that which *he is*, and that which he is expected, or *ought to be*. Thus the objective standard becomes a subjective ideal. By means of the memory and of his power of picturing his monitors as present when he is alone, he gets their advice as if they were really present. And since every act done in conformity with this imposed standard becomes a new determination of himself, he gradually grows into the habit of doing things as other people do them—he becomes social, because he reacts intentionally in a manner similar to theirs. With the increase of knowledge and a growing sense of his powers, he gradually learns to do more than is expected of him, because his ideal of himself has grown beyond that of society. He still acts as he feels he must act; the sense of obligation is even stronger now than it was before, because he must be true to himself, and thus maintain the unity of his consciousness. But the standard is now internal instead of external, and has risen beyond that of society. He has reached the period of freedom or self-determination.

In this process two conditions have been absolutely necessary: an objective standard imposed by society, and the differ-

entiation of the child's mind into intellect, will, and emotion. Without the former, sociality can hardly rise above the standard of animals based purely on the feeling of pleasure, as may be seen from the examples of men living in very small hordes or in almost complete isolation; without the latter condition, socialization cannot take place, because we have no proper individuality that is to be socialized, as may be seen from the example of defectives of all kinds living in civilized countries. In order to be socialized, the individual absolutely needs society. His need of harmonious development points beyond himself for satisfaction. He needs society for his physical, intellectual, and moral welfare.

This brief and rather sketchy discussion of the "dialectic of social growth," as Professor Baldwin¹ has called the process of development, was necessary as an introduction to our present topic—feeling as the source of sociality. What, then, is the motive power in the individual consciousness during this process?

Let us first see why and how a child learns to conform to the standard of society. Such a standard may be either a precept or an example. That a precept owes its force to an appeal to the emotions is amply proved by the numerous, although different, systems of reward and punishment practised both at home and in school. And if modern education does not avail itself of these systems so extensively, it is simply because the appeal to the emotions has been pushed farther back. We try to make reward and punishment superfluous by enlisting the interest of the child at the outset. But interest is an intellectual feeling, as we saw before. From the study of children, we know approximately what will appeal to them, *i. e.*, what objects are likely to call forth cognitions which will react upon the emotions. No more need be said about this matter.

It is not much different with examples. Their educational value consists in their power to induce to imitation. But what is this power? An appeal to the emotions. An example must call forth interest in the imitator, otherwise it fails. If the ex-

¹ "*Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*," p. 512.

ample is one to be avoided, it must arouse fear, disgust, or contempt. Hero-worship, which is so essential to imitation, is based on love and admiration; and these two emotions are, fortunately, very strong in children and many adults, although more spontaneous in the former than in the latter. The aim of educators should be to present heroes to the child, who both excite to imitation and are worthy of it. The different forms which imitation takes cannot be discussed here.¹ But imitation is, after all, only a subordinate method of socialization; we find it only in very young children and in older persons whose mental development is defective. The motive for this method abides, however, as a permanent socializing force. It takes the form of love for one's family, of loyalty toward leaders, of admiration toward superiors, of patriotism for the native country, of devotion toward comrades and intellectual pursuits, of reverence toward the aged and the mysteries of religion. In one form or another, the emotions bring men together and reconcile the conflicting interests of individuals. And the faculty to evoke these different emotions in its members, is a necessity for the existence of any social institution.

But the strongest socializing, because the greatest individualizing force is the feeling of obligation which comes from the sense of power. When the individual has reached the stage where he habitually conforms to everything that is expected of him, a new dualism arises in his own consciousness, that is, if he is a developing individual. Perhaps the majority of men do not know of this conflict in an acute form, since their mental development does not go beyond that of their society. They are the sheep which follow the shepherd. And they must have a shepherd with proper qualifications to lead them, else society will stagnate. The developing individual is such a leader. He has learned all that society can teach, and he repays the debt thus incurred by teaching society what he has learned in addition. He has become an individual through the medium

¹Bain, "*The Senses and the Intellect*," pp. 413-417, and Professor Baldwin, "*Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*," Chapters I and II, treat of this subject more fully.

of his associates, and he now becomes the medium of making them larger individuals. He must do this, since his own growth is retarded if his fellow-men lag behind, because the growth of the individual depends on the principle of give-and-take between himself and society. But if society cannot give him any more, he must stop growing. The development of his own individuality thus points beyond himself for completion. Then again, he must express himself, because only through expression can he find out what he is. And expression needs an appreciative audience in order to become complete. Only when his audience responds to his appeals and his teaching, and appropriates his artistic creations by appreciation, is he sure of having succeeded in expressing himself. No keener disappointment can befall any man than that which comes to the artist whose creations are not appreciated. He has expressed his own self as far as possible in his art, and the rejection thereof means a rejection of himself. But the need and the impulse for expression is imperative in him, and appreciation is, consequently, necessary for the completion of his individuality. The latter requirement again points beyond himself for its fulfilment. A developing individual needs, then, a developing society for the completion of his own personality. The consciousness of his power evokes a feeling of obligation to help his fellow-men toward a larger realization of their own individuality, and thus the conscience of the reformer is born. This may be defined as *the dualism in the consciousness of the reformer arising from the knowledge of what HE IS and what OTHER PEOPLE OUGHT TO BE*. And since this dualism can become a unity only when other people meet the reformer's requirements, he makes it his business to arouse them to do their duty. This demand he feels and tries to enforce as an ethical obligation. Expressed in terms of psychology, it means the restoration of unity in his own consciousness; in terms of sociology, the intentional similar reaction of his fellow-men to those of himself on the same stimulus.

The different steps in this process we shall try to trace in the next division.

THE RISE AND FUNCTION OF THE INDIVIDUATING AND OF THE SOCIAL ME'S.

We have seen¹ that the child becomes an individual through feeling, and that he becomes a moral or social being through the emotions;² it is now our duty to show that the purely individual and the social tendencies are elements of the one consciousness. We must treat, accordingly:

1. Of the Rise of the individuating and the social Me's.

In order to understand other human beings, we must be able to reproduce their mental processes in our own consciousness. But there are two concentric circles in our mind; the inner, which consists principally of feelings and spontaneous actions; and the outer, which comprises our cognitions and voluntary actions. Through the former we are aware of ourselves immediately; through the latter, mediately, since cognitions and volitions need a feeling by means of which they are referred to the Me. In our feelings and emotions we are more purely subjective, in the cognitions and volitions somewhat more objective. This larger circle appears to be once removed from our innermost Me. Our volitions and cognitions have, nevertheless, considerable warmth, and we instantly recognize them as *ours* on account of that feeling. Our Me is thus a *felt* Me all through. But the same must be true of other individuals. How, then, do we become aware of their consciousness?

If two men are to have mental intercourse, they must be able to communicate in some way. Suppose *A* wants to tell *B* about the multiplication table. He forms his thoughts in the most fitting order; he puts them into suitable words, and that is all he can do about it, the success or failure of his intention depends now on other things. The air must be set in motion, the waves must strike my ear, and the latter must be in proper condition to receive and transmit them. My mind, *i. e.*, *B's*, must be sufficiently differentiated to interpret this physical fact into a mental fact. If so, it becomes first a cognition by passing through the different stages of sensation, perception and

¹ Cf. pp. 19-25.

² Cf. pp. 65 ff.

conception. *A's* thought has thus become a part of my consciousness. But it does not so far affect me very much, because it has not entered the inner of the two concentric circles. In order to do that it must react either upon the will or upon the emotions. In the former case it becomes a more intimate part of the Me, because it produces action and enlists the whole of consciousness, and in the latter it does still more so, since a specific emotion has been called forth in addition to the neutral feeling with which any cognition is accompanied. If any emotion is evoked we say that the information conveyed was interesting.

In a manner somewhat like this we receive our information from other men. We are never directly aware of another consciousness, as we are of our own, through feeling. We can see, therefore, why *A's* thoughts should appear so cold to *B*. It is twice, or rather thrice, removed from my felt Me, because it had to pass from *A's* outer circle of consciousness through the physical intermedia into the outer circle of my consciousness. And if it is not interesting, it remains there as a pale and cold thought of *A's*. If it proves to be interesting, by reacting upon the emotions, it immediately becomes my own because it has that peculiar warmth which only my own thoughts have. We may also see now why the emotions of *A* have but little effect upon *B*, or *B's* upon *A*. An emotion cannot be communicated, but only knowledge concerning it, *i. e.*, a part of the psychic energy of the emotion is converted into knowledge, and passes thus from the inner circle into the outer, etc. It is, consequently, four times removed from my own emotions, and it may never be anything more to me than a piece of information. If I am to feel with *A*, the information communicated to me concerning his emotion must be very interesting, and react strongly upon my own feelings, so that I may reproduce a similar emotion in my own consciousness. This process is similar to that by which we revive our own emotions through the memory, although the latter process is much easier, since the memory of our own emotions is always interesting. Cognitions are, then, comparatively easily com-

municated, but not the warmth thereof; volitions, too, since they can be acted out and become thus states of knowledge; both become thus largely objective, because they proceed from the outer circle of our consciousness. But emotions are almost entirely subjective, since they form the inner circle of our consciousness, the felt Me.

Around this felt Me cluster a number of interests which form the immediate content of consciousness, because always felt and always present. They are almost entirely incommunicable and unshareable, since they concern my innermost psychic life. The complexity and the ideality, the breadth and the intensity of my psychic life I cannot share fully with others, because I *feel* it more than I know it, and cannot, consequently, put it into proper words. How can we tell others of those states of intense longing for a broader and richer life? We use some conventional words which are understood, since their meaning is common property. As we proceed further and speak of our own particular state of longing, words begin to fail, and are often misunderstood. When we have succeeded with great difficulty in clearing away all misinterpretations, we try to proceed, but we soon give up the task as hopeless, since we find neither thoughts nor words. Who has ever succeeded in giving us a picture, either by means of the pen or the brush, of what he feels his ideal self to be? The most wonderful poet and the most imaginative writer fail here. The artist looks despondently at the picture which the public and all critics declare to be a full revelation of his noble soul. He knows better. And he does not lay all the blame upon the inadequacy of the material, since he is conscious that he has not been able to conceive his ideal clearly in thought, simply because that ideal was in its innermost core a feeling. The wise poet and the successful artist in this line is not he who tries to define and to depict, but he who suggests and sets our own imagination on fire, so that we too may *feel* what he felt but vainly tried to express.

Individuality, *i. e.*, the innermost meaning of each human life, cannot be defined or described. It gives rise, however, to

what we call "atmosphere," a word usually applied to striking personalities. The word conveys some idea, or rather suggests a picture, of the influence which certain individuals have upon us, but which we cannot put into words of logic. Strictly speaking, every individual, every institution, every nation, and every civilization has its own "atmosphere." And here lies the hopelessness of most discussions, especially religious. Scientists and philosophers may discuss different theories calmly, change their views, and not be disturbed in the least, since the matters concerned are chiefly of an intellectual nature and are hardly ever part of their innermost consciousness. It is different with religion. Just because the latter consists principally of feelings after an ideal self, is it impossible to put it into language. Take the case of two religious views as nearly alike as those of Methodists and Episcopalians. A representative of the former and of the latter may, after a candid and friendly argument, come to very similar conclusions. And still, each of these will feel at the end of the conference that there is a gulf fixed between them, not, indeed, one expressible in thought, but one of different "atmospheres." It is much easier for both to understand and admit the soundness of each other's arguments, than to remove those feelings in which each has lived and moved so long and which constitute the essence of his religious being. It takes a long time to grow into that. But when he has grown into it, arguments will come home with double force, and new ones will suggest themselves to the prospective convert. And the conversion will not be a leap, but a gradual transition, because a gradual change of his "atmosphere." The former Roman Catholic will then have no difficulty in accepting the Unitarian faith, and the Unitarian convert to Rome will wonder how he could ever have been satisfied with that cold and emotionally empty creed of his former associates. It seems to me that most religious discussions have been barren of results because they treated religion—perhaps necessarily so in a public discussion—as a purely intellectual problem. As a matter of fact, hymnology has done more to draw men of different religious per-

suasions together than any amount of polemical or eirenical literature. Hymns express the emotions more nearly than creeds, because they express the attitude of the "heart" in worship. And the Episcopalian who reads or sings a good Methodist hymn, not only understands but feels now that there may be people outside the pale of his own church, who are truly religious.

One more illustration of the same fact. Many Orientals come to European institutions of learning, and master all that Europe has to teach them. But they still remain and are easily recognized as Orientals. Why? Because their emotional attitude is entirely different. They may change their intellectual attitude in five or ten years, and may store up the best of European learning; but their feelings are still different from those of an Anglo-Saxon or a member of the Teutonic race. The change of "atmosphere" takes much longer, and is, except in a few rare instances—if then—never complete. The case of Britons living in Germany for two-score years and still remaining English, seems to indicate that civilizations so widely apart as the Oriental and Occidental can never be assimilated completely by a representative of one or the other, since Germany and America prove that nations of essentially the same mental attitude and culture, are not able to completely assimilate representatives of the other, in spite of the vastly smaller differences. If the problem involved were merely one of knowledge, it would be difficult to understand the tenacity and indestructibility of racial and national traits in new environments; but if it is a matter of the feelings, we can see why a man cannot change them, since it would mean the giving up of his very individuality.

The difference between culture and refinement on the one hand, and intellectual acquisition and boorishness on the other, lies in the emotions. A man may possess all the learning that can be taught, and still be "impossible" in polite society and a failure with humbler folks. Why? Because his cognitions have never reacted on his emotions; the latter have, consequently, not been refined, broadened, and enlarged.

With all his knowledge his feelings are still of a crude and elementary type, as in the case of a savage. The subtlety, the fineness, and the delicacy of the emotions are the mark of the "gentleman" and of the "gentlewoman" rather than intellectual attainments and cleverness. The learning of a civilization may be acquired by a strong intellect; its emotions are usually out of the reach of one not "to the manner born." And the comparatively ignorant peasant may have the latter mark of civilization to a larger extent than the university professor, simply because it is not a matter of the intellect alone, but chiefly of the emotions. The intellect has not refined the latter by reacting upon the elementary feelings. There is a certain defect in the unity of consciousness of such an individual; he is not complete, and he is lacking in the most essential thing, since we feel that in the intellect we have not "got at" the man, but only at his outer consciousness. The fact that some men are general favorites, although ignorant of many things, seems to indicate that they have an emotional delicacy of a high order, and every one who comes into contact with them feels this immediately and responds to it, because this feeling implies a closer approach to another individual than mere learning can do. "Im Herzen steckt der Mensch, nicht im Kopf," says Schopenhauer.¹ And the further fact, that we rate people as "gentlemen" and "gentlewomen," or as boors, seems to indicate a general recognition of the emotions as the paramount element in culture. This element can, however, not be acquired as quickly and easily as information—another indication that the emotions are more truly of the essence of the individual than his intellectual attainments. Knowledge is, of course, very important as a means of culture. It furnishes the material to the mind to extend its range both in a horizontal and in a vertical direction. But for a harmonious development of the whole individual it is of supreme importance that the cognitions should react on the feelings, since the innermost core of the mind consists in the emotions, and they must be refined and broadened

¹ Johannes Volkelt, *Arthur Schopenhauer*, p. 150.

if the quality of the individual as a whole is to be improved. What we call the "barbarism" of youth is due to the fact that there is a very rapid increase in knowledge during that comparatively short period. The energy of the mind is engaged chiefly in acquiring information, but owing to this direction of mental force toward the outside world, the reactions of the cognitions upon the feelings are not as strong and frequent as desirable. The feelings are very strong, both because the youth is still to a large extent a child with an undifferentiated mind, and because at the age of puberty a large number of new ones have arisen. But they are crude and elementary, since the cognitions, absorbing practically all the mental energy, have not reacted on them. The mind is, therefore, somewhat unsettled. The "settling down" means that as soon as there is a lull in the acquisition of knowledge, the cognitions react on the feelings and refine them. The individual gains his balance again, and develops more harmoniously.

This excursus has, I trust, made clear the point at issue: that the feelings and the emotions form the inner circle of our consciousness, and are, on that ground, to be considered as the most essential part of our mental life. This fact explains why they cannot be communicated to others as directly as our cognitions and volitions.

There are, then, interests which cluster immediately around the Me, and thus form the innermost core of our consciousness. These are largely unshareable, and they constitute the *individuating* Me. We may describe it as consisting of *those states of consciousness of whose existence I am immediately aware, although I cannot communicate them to others; especially that feeling of separation from and exclusion of others, which constitutes the difference between them and myself.*

But there are other interests which are grouped around the individuating Me. They are a little less intimate, but very numerous, and, withal, of the greatest importance to a complex mental life. These are the interests of the will, the intellect, and of certain emotions. This is the outer circle of my consciousness through which I come into contact with others and

they with me. These interests are vital, since their fortune affects me seriously; and they are expanding, since in this realm the Me proceeds by inclusion instead of exclusion. My work, my success, my friends, acquaintances, family, state, country, race, the progress of the world at large, they all belong here. The larger these interests become, the larger my Me grows. But there are circles within this circle. My own thoughts and actions are very close to, if not within, the inner circle. Next come my family, friends and their interests; then come acquaintances, country, race, etc., in endless number. My own thoughts and actions have, of course, a peculiar warmth, and are always easily appropriated by the Me. But how about my friends? I know them only through representation, since knowledge of them comes to me only by the roundabout process described a little while ago. But why do I take such a keen interest in them, almost as keen as in my own acts? Because my cognition of them immediately reacts on my feelings, and produces an emotion of joy, happiness, etc. At our first meeting this reaction was, perhaps, slight; but through the increase in the number of associations about them, my cognitions react more promptly and more strongly upon my emotions. By numerous repetitions of this process, the reaction becomes almost as spontaneous as in the case of cognitions which concern me more directly, because they originated with me and were removed, consequently, not thrice but only once from the core of my consciousness.

This kind of reaction is necessary if my interest in other human beings is to be vital and permanent. Sociality is possible only when the emotions are socialized; a mere intellectual interest in others is not sufficient. Professor Baldwin¹ claims that our social consciousness arises from a "self-thought situation," which he explains as "the social situation implicated in the thought of self." He implies that there are two poles in our consciousness, the *ego* and the *alter*, and "that I throw the emphasis on one pole sometimes, calling it me; and on the other pole sometimes, calling it you or him." This "self-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 492.

thought situation" is, however, insufficient as an explanation of socialization. The Greeks did this, but the result was that the world contained Hellenes and *barbarians*. The Hebrews did it, but they divided mankind into Jews and Gentiles. The shrewd business-man and politician do it, but an unprintable phrase is the result. A "self-thought situation" too often ends in the words of the Pharisee: "God, I thank Thee that I am not as other men are."¹ Sociality, *i. e.*, action with and for other people, can never be brought about by the intellect alone, just as feeling alone is not able to produce it among animals and savages. The intellect must devise ways and means on the basis of present conditions, the will must be sufficiently strong to carry them out, but the motive force in the whole matter is supplied by the emotions. Few reforms have been brought about by merely putting oneself in the place of another. The man who saw and *felt*, whose heart was stirred by the sight of suffering mankind, has been the practical reformer. He may often have misconceived his aim and employed the wrong means; but he was after all the man who did something to keep alive the spark of hope in despairing men and suffering women. If social activity is to have any value, it must proceed from the whole man, and not from his intellect only. There must be a reaction from the latter upon the emotions; sympathy must be aroused for our fellowmen; and their trials and tribulations, their struggles and temptations must be reproduced in our own consciousness. The housing question in lower New York City is a case in point. Theoretically every house-owner believes that good tenements will pay, because it has been proven by facts and figures that they do. But this argument has convinced but few men of business to try the experiment. Practically all the model tenements have been built by people who were interested primarily in the moral and spiritual welfare of the poorer classes—people who regarded the latter as brothers and sisters to be loved.

How do we come to this extension of our Me? It arises in the family. Just as the child learns to know himself as an

¹ St. Luke xviii. 11.

individual through the agency of his environment, so he learns to extend his Me by means of the latter. Father, mother, sister, brother, playmates, etc., are so frequently associated with the child that his interests are identified with them, since his needs and wants can be satisfied only by them. It is the fact of the child's helplessness, and the resulting feeling of dependence which brings home to him the great lesson that his life is not confined to his own body, but that those around him are an important part of himself. Their love and reproof, their tears and laughter, soon affect him almost as much as his own joys and pains, because his cognitions about them immediately react on his own emotions. As his intellect grows through intercourse with others and through education, the fortunes of an ever larger number of men and things affect him—his *social Me* expands. *The social Me consists of those states of consciousness of whose existence I am mediate aware through the intellect, and which I can communicate to others; especially that feeling of proprietorship in others, which constitutes a bond of union between them and myself.*

But no matter how intensively and extensively others may interest me, there is always this great difference, that they exist for me mediate through the intellect, and that I exist for myself immediately through feeling. And this great cleavage brings about a division of interests. "Each of us is animated by a *direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence*, whatever that may be, taken merely as such."¹ I am willing to sacrifice my prospects in life, my social position, my honor, and even my life for them, still it is *I* who do that for *them*; they are still the *others*, the outsiders, more or less strangers to this warm *felt* me. And yet this me is so bound up with the others, so dependent on their regard and appreciation, that I cannot do without it. At the very time when I am willing to cut loose from all my associates, when, as a moral hero, I am determined to defy the whole world, I long and yearn for the love and sympathy of at least *one* of these others. His appreciation of my heroism will

¹ W. James, *Psychology*, i, p. 318. Italics his.

materially strengthen my determination to defy the rest of mankind; his indifference or mockery will very likely cause the collapse of my resolution. The sense of the *ego* is, thus, closely interwoven with the sense of the *alter*. His interests are my interests; his sympathy and appreciation make me. The interests of the *ego* and the *alter*, *i. e.*, those of the individuating and of the social Me are, then, closely connected with each other, and overlap frequently. We may, consequently, describe the total Me as *that continuous series of lively interests—in himself, in things and in other persons—the possession of which makes him feel as furthering, and the loss or absence of which as retarding the growth of his individuality.*

This description involves that the individual identifies himself with his different interests, and that he refers all of them, no matter how varied and distant, to the Me, and thus identifies them with himself. It means, therefore, the unity of his individuating with his social Me, or the unity of his consciousness as a whole. The *Me* is, consequently, the *ego* from the psychological point of view. But the individual comes to a knowledge of his ego through an ideal process, and could, indeed, never attain to it without an ideal. Let us see how this was done.¹

We found that the individual is immediately aware of himself through feeling; but feeling can give him a life of identity only in the present, as in the case of the animal. If he is to identify himself with the past, he must have memory to recall his interests from the past. Thus he makes the transition from the real to the ideal state through memory. Again, if he is to be socialized, he must not only yield to the demands of others for the time being, but he must be able to picture his monitors as present when he is about to do something which his memory tells him was wrong under particular circumstances. By his power to represent others as present, he takes the second step from the real into the ideal world. By means of the memory and of the imagination he finally conceives himself as he ought to be, and thus takes the third step from

¹*Cf.* pp. 48 ff. for details.

the real into the ideal. This picture of himself may be projected either into the present or into the future. In the former case he strives after what society wants him to be; in the latter, he rises above society after he has learned all that his social environment could teach him and then applies his own ideal to society, and he becomes a reformer. Now this whole ideal process, based on the power of abstracting principles from a continuous series of interchanges between himself and society, is dependent on the unity of his consciousness. When a social demand has once become a part of his consciousness, it remains there for good. He may set himself against it, but by the very fact that he does so, the proof is furnished that it influences him. And he can never be at peace with himself until he adopts the standard of society as his own, because his consciousness will become a unity only then; for the wicked man is at discord with himself. Again, when he has become a reformer, the same principle is at work. The miserable state of his fellow-men has become a permanent part of his consciousness, and he can never be at peace with himself until he has tried to lift society to his own level. And society, on the other hand, is not and cannot be at peace so soon as the reformer's voice has reached them and his message has become part of their consciousness. For society now occupies the place which the reformer occupied before he had been socialized; and the reformer represents society at its best. He is, for the time being, in the position of Aristotle's King,¹ whose reaction to society is that of the whole to a part, and who has, therefore, the right to ask obedience of his fellow-men. But if another man reaches a high ideal and preaches a more profound morality or calls attention to more vital interests, the first reformer lapses back into the condition of the learner with the rest of society. There is, thus, a constant interplay of give-and-take going on between the individual and society, or between the individuating and the social Me, if the process be interpreted and reproduced in the consciousness of any one individual.

¹*Politics*, Bk. III, chap. 17, towards the end.

The same fact may be interpreted from another point of view. Suppose the case of the moral hero mentioned a little while ago. The hero has outgrown society, and he is conscious of a dualism in himself. The only way to heal the breach is by trying to reform society. But suppose he fails. Two possibilities are open now. If he is really a *moral* hero, he will seek refuge in faith; he will posit the unity of the universe through God, and hope against hope that God will bring all things to the consummation of peace and unity. This is what the most ardent reformers have to do when they look at the comparatively slow acceptance of their plans. If our reformer is, however, a "vainglorious" man who seeks not so much the benefit of mankind as the gratification of his vanity which he can get only through other men, he will inevitably collapse in case he does not find a small clique to uphold him. He will look at his clique as the only representatives of a "higher civilization," and heap abuse and execrations on the rest of mankind. If he find no men whatever to support him, suicide is the inevitable result. He ends in pessimism in either case, since no thinking man who knows and feels his isolation, can live without being embittered in the very core of his being. Suppose again that our hero is one of those people like Nietzsche's *Uebermensch*, who, knowing his power, flings defiance at all the *weaklings* below him. Two possibilities present themselves as ways leading out of the difficulty. If he is unable to gather a clique around him, he may acknowledge himself in the wrong, and return as a prodigal to his father's home. If he is consistent, he must consider his clique as real weaklings, and therefore as unworthy of his companionship, or as selfish schemers. In the former case he must know and feel the isolation of his position, and end, like the "vainglorious" man, in pessimism, suicide, or the insane asylum. In the latter case he will see the sword of Damokles hanging constantly over his head, and fear, distrust, and hatred will destroy all his good qualities; he, too, will become a schemer and a trickster. But these are qualities on which no man can lead a healthy life, and so he must gradually become embittered.

tered toward himself and all the world. Abdul Hamid, the present Sultan of Turkey, is a good illustration of this type.

The unity of consciousness is, consequently, an absolute necessity for a healthy individual life, and that unity depends on a constant interchange of relations with society. The possibility of redeeming the individual and of reforming society rests on this principle. The criminal and the sinner are conscious of their discord with society and with God, and their yearning for unity can be realized only by returning to society and to God. When a superior individual presents a higher morality, he creates a dualism in the consciousness of his fellow-men by holding up before them a higher ideal. And they must rise to that, if it be a true one, or be at discord with themselves, since they cannot eliminate from their consciousness what has once become a part thereof. They may, of course, declare the reformer a crank and a fake, and thus save themselves.

And this is exactly what happens in a society which has become blasé and has lost its vitality. And why has it lost its vitality? Because it has lost its power to react emotionally. Nothing affects such men, since they react to new impressions only intellectually. They are not moved beyond a mere cynical smile; their deeper emotions are never aroused. The fate of their fellow-men does not enter the inner circle of their consciousness, but only the outer. No wholesome enthusiasm for friend, country, or mankind ever stirs their breast, and so they perform their daily task in an indifferent, machine-like manner. They are to a large extent de-individualized, and, therefore, unprogressive. Such men are beyond redemption, unless some one succeeds in bringing about a reaction that will arouse emotions. For emotions are an absolute necessity to a progressive society and to a developing individual. A society which does not feel its power and rejoice in its attainments, which does not hope and believe in its own future, cannot socialize its members and is bound to perish through discord. An individual who does not feel his power and rejoice in his attainments, who does not believe in his fellow-men and hope

for better things to come, cannot influence his fellow-men toward a higher morality. He may be keen and witty in his denunciations of evil, he may say any number of clever things; but the note of inspiration and authority are wanting, because he has lost faith in himself. He cannot arouse the enthusiasm of others, because he has none himself. He cannot reach the hearts of his fellow-men, because he is not stirred in the very depth of his own heart.

And these emotions must be positive, that is, out-going emotions—joy, hope, faith, sympathy, love, kindness. All of them point beyond the individual for their exercise and completion. These are the optimist's emotions; they enrich the individual and society; they reconcile conflicting interests; they express the unity of the individual with himself and society most fully. The pessimist has his emotions, too; but they are of a different and negative kind—fear, distrust, despair, envy, hatred, *et hoc genus omne*. They are not enriching but impoverishing life; they are not going out to other men, except to distress them, and thus they generally return to their owner to distress and discourage him even more. The man who cannot enrich the life of others, impoverishes his own; the man who enriches others, enriches himself, since the inexorable law of give-and-take binds him to society, and whatsoever he gives, that must he also take.

And why these negative emotions? Because the individual is not at one with himself. The balance between his individuating and his social Me is lacking. He is either not socialized or not individualized. In the former case he is at war with society either from choice or from some mental defect, and he suffers through the conflict; in the latter he returns to society less, or at least no more, than he receives, and his feeling of individuality suffers, since he appears to himself as a hired man who does a certain amount of work for a certain amount of pay. In order to be at one with himself he must be at peace with society, and thus satisfy his social Me; he must feel just a little above society—at least, some members thereof—and thus satisfy his individuating Me. The former gives him a congenial en-

vironment to work in, the latter the sense of power to do that work properly. The social Me gives breadth and richness to his life, the individuating Me makes it sweet and precious. The balance between the two can never be struck evenly. The individual will have to be satisfied to be a teacher to-day, and a pupil to-morrow. And it is well that this is so, since a progressive society and a developing individual need just this kind of arrangement. Society exists, moreover, for the express purpose to disturb the balance between the individuating and the social Me constantly. Its object is to do this as far as possible in every one of its members, by bringing a number of them into contact with each other, and having them exchange the gifts which nature has given to each. Only in this way can a rich and broad culture arise in society, and a full and harmonious development of the individual be brought about. Society must, then, socialize its members in order to make a social, *i. e.*, a co-operative, life possible; and it must individualize them, in order to insure progress. A society which succeeds only in the former, becomes stagnant; and one which succeeds only in the latter, sows the seeds of its own ruin. The two processes go hand in hand, and must do so at least in the majority of the members of a society. In all the different spheres of life these processes must go on, since each sphere contributes to the whole of social and of individual life. Expressed in terms of the individual consciousness, this means both a strong social and a strong individuating Me; the former guarantees co-operation through its conservatism, the latter ensures progress through its initiative.

It will be necessary now to discuss the growth of the individual and that of society in detail.

2. The function of the individuating and of the social Me's.

Man is a unity. This has been our contention all through this paper. But he learns the fact through society, *i. e.*, another unity composed of a number of smaller unities. In order to understand his relation to this larger unity, it may be well now to consider briefly some other unities, and thus to find out the differences between them.

Anything that is to be considered as a system or as a whole must have *unity*. From this point of view we have :

a. The *Mechanism*, in which unity is imposed from without, *e. g.*, a machine.

b. The *Organism*, which has unity within itself in one centre; in this group there are three subdivisions: (1) the sub-conscious organisms, *e. g.*, plants; (2) the conscious organism, *e. g.*, animals; and (3) the self-conscious organism, man.

c. The *Organization*, with unity within itself, but in many centres.

The division of systems will justify itself when the differences between the groups are understood.

How does a machine come into existence? If it is to do any work successfully, it must have unity, that is, its parts must be co-ordinated in such a manner that each will contribute its share toward the accomplishment of that work. The parts must, consequently, bear exact mathematical relations to each other and to the whole. In other words, the parts of a perfect machine can be expressed in terms of the whole without the least fraction; they are perfectly commensurable. Perpetual motion is, therefore, possible from a theoretical point of view, since mathematical relations can be made perfect by man; the difficulty is that the forces of nature, *e. g.*, friction and gravitation, interfere with this arrangement. In order to construct a machine we must, then, bring different kinds of material into definite mathematical relations; we must *give* it unity. This unity which makes a machine a system is, however, imposed from without upon parts and materials which were not related to each other except under the general laws of nature, especially that of gravitation.

An organism has unity within itself. Its very nature consists in the subordination of materials and parts to a whole. But the unifying principle is within the organism. Given the necessary conditions of moisture, heat and soil, a seed will sprout, grow and develop into a plant after its own kind without any assistance from the outside. It is true that fructification depends in many plants upon insects and favorable winds,

but that is a question of propagation, *i. e.*, of race-continuance; for its individual existence the plant depends only upon heat, moisture and favorable soil, all of which conditions it uses for its own advantage by means of its principle of unity. The plant may, for the present, stand as a representative of the other groups of organisms.

The organization, too, has unity within itself, but the principle of unity is not in one centre. Its unity consists rather in a number of intimate and complex psychical relations between the different members who compose the organization. Since psychical facts can be communicated only by physical means, an organization absolutely needs for its existence symbols of its life, *e. g.*, institutions of various kinds, language, habitat in a contiguous place, etc. And these symbols are parts of the things signified, and form, as such, the visible, external, and objective principle of unity. The important point to notice is, however, that they are merely expressions of psychical relations, and that they lose all significance without the latter; just as the latter could not find expression except through the former. The capital city and the ruler of a country are visible expressions of unity of a country's inhabitants who may be scattered all over the earth, *e. g.*, London and the English monarch. That does not mean, of course, that London and the English King are mere symbols, since each has a local and individual existence. But so far as they stand for the unity of the British Empire, they are symbols of a whole which consists in psychical relations.

How do these three groups of systems react? For it is their mode of reaction which manifests the different natures of their unity. The machine reacts in one way only, *i. e.*, the way it was intended to react. A stone-crusher is intended to crush stones, and not to make shoes. An ocean steamship would be useless as a means of propelling freight on a railway. In each case the particular kind of reaction is predetermined by the maker of the machine; and the latter's utility corresponds to the exactness with which it reacts upon the given action. The reason for this mechanical reaction is to be found in the fact

that the action is generally outside of the machine. There is only juxtaposition between the acting and the reacting masses of matter; there is no interpenetration between the two.

The essential difference between an organism and a mechanism in regard to reaction is, that the latter depends entirely on its environment, and that it does not *select* in any way, if we except magnetic and electric attraction and repulsion. The organism is not so dependent, but makes its own environment to a large extent, by selecting from it those particles of matter which are useful. A portion of this mechanical energy is transformed into vital and psychical energy; another portion retains its character of reacting like inorganic matter, and thus the organism has weight, extension, etc. Let us now take up each one of the groups of organisms mentioned, and discuss in turn their mode of reaction, because we may be able to find the reason why their difference in reaction permits them to emancipate themselves gradually from the accidentals of their environment.

The plant is usually fixed in position. It depends, consequently, for its maintenance on its ability to select from its immediate environment those particles of inorganic matter which it can assimilate. Almost all plants manifest a choice in this respect; and their differences are due to this selection of favored molecules which contribute to their nourishment. But the plant is not satisfied with the immediately given environment; it sends out roots and shoots to draw food from a larger circumference both in the ground and in the air. And more than that. By sending its rootlets into the smallest crevices and fissures of its environment, the plant turns—assisted by the influence of moisture and atmosphere—the hard and solid rock into soil from which it may draw more nourishment. The plant thus actually changes its environment, and becomes independent to a certain extent.

Animals have a larger share of independence, because—being capable of moving about freely—they readily leave their habitat if food becomes scarce. And a greater degree of choice is characteristic of animals; the horse, for instance, dis-

tinguishes not only between wholesome and poisonous plants, but between more and less palatable ones. Frequently food is stored up for the future and for the offspring, as among insects and certain mammalia. In the struggle for existence certain modes of attack and defence are established and become almost perfect. The ingenuity of some animals in providing food for their offspring, *e. g.*, the mud-wasp, and of others, like the beaver, in building places of abode, is remarkable. The animal is, then, more independent because of its greater power of selection and reaction.

But the animal is not so independent as man, since a great gulf seems to be fixed between the two. This great difference is due to the use of tools by man. The animal always works directly, man usually works indirectly. The use of tools creates a tremendous difference in the mode of reaction between man and animal, since man has proceeded to construct out of the simplest tools vast and ingenious machines which enable him to multiply his ability of production anywhere from a hundred to a thousand times, and to accomplish tasks which he would be unable to do without them. So completely has he emancipated himself from his environment, that he is practically the only organism which can live in all climates. To what is this difference due? How was man able to use the tool in his progress? It is not a physical, but a psychical superiority. Many animals surpass man in physical strength, not only absolutely, but much more relatively. Then, too, the animals are much better equipped for the battle of life than man; they have some means of defense and attack at their birth, while he has none. The difference must be due, then, to psychical, and not physical facts.

Animals have the elementary feelings which man has; but their psychic life does not proceed beyond that. They do not form any definite relations to their environment. Hunger, thirst, sexual desire, and in some cases, care for their offspring, seem to circumscribe the whole of their mental life. The world is to them a big, buzzing blur. They do not clearly distinguish between different objects, because they do not relate them to a

self. They are simply a part of their environment, upon which they react as occasion demands. Their psychic life is circumscribed by physical needs, because it is *physically inherited*; and because it is physically inherited it is fixed within a very narrow circle. The young wasp and the young bird build just as artistic nests as their mothers, although they have never seen the latter perform the task.¹ Man, on the contrary, assumes definite relations to the world at large, because his feelings are differentiated into intellect, will and emotion. His mind is plastic and educable because it is differentiable; and it is differentiable because he does not enter the world with a definite equipment sufficient for all his needs and wants. All that nature gives him are certain capacities which he must develop by his own exertion; mere potentialities which must become actualities. He attains this aim by relating himself to his environment in a definite manner, sometimes direct, more often indirect. He stoops to conquer. He takes his environment into his own consciousness, selects what is suitable for his purposes, and makes it thus his own. He is free, because in this process there can never be a question of external coercion. He acts only in so far as he *wills* or *chooses*. "Der Mensch ist frei, und wär er in Ketten geboren," says Schiller. He conquers even the last enemy, death, because he makes it his own by *willing* to die. And in relating himself to his environment in different ways, he supplements the gifts of nature by acquiring through his own efforts what she has given to animals at the outset—a sufficient equipment to cope with the forces of his environment. On account of this attitude towards society, his relations are not static, but dynamic, because he consciously associates himself with his own kind for a definite purpose—he reacts in a manner similar to theirs, and thus becomes a member of an organization.

An organization differs materially in its modes of reaction both from the mechanism and the organism, although all three

¹ Birds hatched in captivity do not, however, build as artistic nests as those which have been reared in a nest; this indicates that the instinct can be developed somewhat.

have unity. This difference is due to the relation of the parts to the whole. In both the mechanism and the organism the parts are commensurable in the whole, and they are perfect only when they can be expressed in terms of the whole without the least friction. A fine watch-spring—worth its weight in gold several times over—is the more valuable the better it performs the work for which it was made; as soon as it fails in that it is worth its weight in old iron only, since it has to be cast over. The arm of a man is useful in proportion as it obeys the brain and thus fulfills its function in the body without the least friction. Self-assertion in the watch-spring or in the arm is a sign of disease, if not of utter uselessness. In the organization this is entirely different. Self-assertion of the parts, *i. e.*, members, is not only excusable, but absolutely necessary to the health and welfare of the whole. The organization which can boast of being able to express its parts in terms of the whole without any fraction, is doomed to stagnation and collapse. The reason for this is easily seen. The unifying principle of an organization consists of the psychical relations of a multitude of minds, for what we call race-knowledge and race-consciousness are nothing else than the knowledge and the consciousness of the entire number or of the majority of the individual members of the race considered in their social capacity; *i. e.*, as modified (a) by the influence which the history, institutions, habits, etc., of that majority exercise over the individuals; (b) by the numerous and increasingly complex actions and reactions of the individual upon his fellow-men, singly and collectively, and of his fellow-men, singly and collectively, upon the individual. Social force is, consequently, psychical energy, *i. e.*, an energy resulting from the intentional or unintentional interactions of minds upon other minds. The organization acts and expresses itself, consequently, through its members; and since these are self-conscious beings, they are conscious of their relation to the whole. This fact, that the individuals are conscious of their relation to the organization, involves three things: (1) that the reactions of the organization are slow; (2) that the organization must stand for

something in which the individual is interested; (3) that the symbols of the organization must form an integral part of the consciousness of the individual.

The reactions of the organization are slow, because, as society is at present constituted, the interaction between different minds is imperfect, partly on account of insufficient knowledge on the part of many individuals, and partly on account of numerous defects in the lines of transmission. These are the reasons why it often takes a large organization years to adapt itself to changing conditions; whereas an organism can react more promptly, since the interaction between the different parts is closer; changes are, consequently, reported more quickly, and adaptations are made more readily. Owing to this close interaction many of the most important functions of an organism have become reflex actions.

The organization must stand for something in which the individual is interested. But each human being is primarily interested in the completion of his own individuality and in that of other men.¹ There are, however, three institutions which serve primarily this purpose: the family, the state, and the church. Other institutions among men merely supplement the functions of these three.

The individual finds his completion in the family because he enters here into as complete a union with another individual as is possible without giving up his own individuality. What Hegel says of man in general, "Self-consciousness finds its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness,"² finds its most complete and suitable application here. The family is, consequently, the union of two individuals of the opposite sex, of suitable age, and of proper physical, mental, and moral equipment, for the purpose of living together under the sanction of society in reciprocal love and service with a view of propagating and educating children. The family is found in various forms among different nations, but there is only one form which

¹ Cf. pp. 66 f.

² *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 134, 2d edition. Berlin, 1841.

meets all the ethical requirements, and that is the monogamous family. This means that not even the basis of right relations exists in polygyny¹ and polyandry, while this basis does exist in the monogamous family. In either of the first two cases mentioned there can be no union in which the individual is contented to live as a member of a whole which has its own *raison d'être*, and in which he finds the fulfilment of his individuality,² because he is used as a means to an end. In polygyny it is the woman, and in polyandry it is the man who becomes a means to the other party. The same statement holds true about illicit unions between men and women. In a true marriage this immorality of using the other party as a means is avoided, because the union is entered upon voluntarily, for life, and for a high moral purpose; and because the surrender is mutual and extends to the whole sphere of life. Such intimate union and mutual self-surrender is, however, possible only between two parties, because only on this condition is the completion of individuality possible. This is the reason why monogamy is necessary for a high civilization.

The individual finds the completion of his individuality in the state, because he comes here in contact with the largest possible number of human beings, and is thus in a situation to help others and be helped by them. Since the membership of the state is so large that the individual can hardly know every other member, he must act here largely on the principle of obligation. The state is thus the very opposite of the family, as far as its function in completing the individuality of its members is concerned. The family is based on the reciprocal love and intimate knowledge of two individuals, and thus completes the individual in depth; the state is based on an incomplete knowledge of many individuals of each other, but at the same time on the acknowledgment of the principle of obligation by each member, and thus completes the individual in breadth.

¹ Professor Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 192, proposes this term for a marriage of several women to one man, and restricts the term monogamy to a marriage of one man to one woman.

² Cf. Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 216, § 158. Berlin, 1840.

In the family his actions are dominated by love, in the state by an abstract principle. "The state is the realization of the moral idea,"¹ is perhaps the briefest and most correct definition of society as organized under a constitution, and having, as such, a right to exist *per se*. This definition implies (1) that the state must have a corporate life of its own in order to realize the "moral idea" through activity; (2) that this purpose can be accomplished only *in* and *through* individuals as self-conscious members of the state; (3) that the state by declaring these individuals to be *free*, enables them to realize the "moral idea" in their corporate capacity through their membership in the organization. It will be seen that "the individual" and "the state" are correlative terms, just as the individual and the family; and that in each organization the individual finds the completion of himself.

The church serves the same function from a different point of view. While the family completes the individual in depth, and the state in breadth, the church may be said to do so in height. The individual is never satisfied with himself as he is; he always looks at himself from the point of view of his ideal. But neither the family nor the state is able to meet that, since there are always imperfections attaching to both. The social nature of man must, consequently, find another outlet in an ideal world; since a true *Socius* can be found only here. The ideal *Socius* can be constructed in such a manner that no imperfections attach to him; he may serve, therefore, as a constant source of inspiration, comfort and companionship. The church supplies this demand of the individual in various ways for the large majority of men. Her principal message is ever concerning the ideal world over against the phenomenal, concerning the future over against the present, concerning the perfect God over against imperfect man. And as long as she preaches this gospel of an ideal world of perfection, she will complete the individual in a very essential way, and fill a place which no other institution occupies.

The symbols of the organization must form an integral part

¹ Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 305, § 257.

of the individual's consciousness. We are aware of other people's existence only through our cognitions; but these must react on our feelings if the symbols of the organization are to become effective in our consciousness, *i. e.*, if they are to become a part of our Me. They can, of course, never become part of our individuating Me, but they must form the contents of the social Me, and thus become interesting to the individual, so that he feels their loss as retarding and their possession as furthering his individuality. This principle is easily understood as far as the family is concerned. Love and affection must form the basis of a happy family life; mere morality and action from obligation can never ensure happiness in the family, but only a respectable and, perhaps, endurable marriage of *convenience*. When we apply the principle to the state, we find likewise that the affections must be called forth, although action is based in this case principally on obligation. A country which is merely known, and, perhaps, respected, but cannot arouse the enthusiasm of its citizens in times of an emergency, is not likely to be successful in a struggle with its neighbors. And again, a church which succeeds only in presenting a high ideal, but fails to enlist the will and the emotions for the realization of that ideal, performs only the minor part of her function. The symbols of an organization must, then, become an integral part of the Me through the reaction of the cognitions upon the emotions. This will give us a clue to the interaction of the two Me's; the reaction of the social upon the individuating Me, and of the latter upon the former. We described¹ the *individuating Me* as *any state of consciousness of whose existence I am immediately aware, although I cannot communicate it to others, especially that feeling of separation from and exclusion of others, which constitutes the difference between them and myself*. The *social Me* we described¹ as *consisting of those states of consciousness of whose existence I am immediately aware through the intellect, and which I can communicate to others; especially that feeling of proprietorship in others, which constitutes a bond of union between them and myself*. But we have seen all

¹ Cf. p. 76.

through that man has a "direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence,"² and that other individuals, or symbols of them, may interest us to such an extent that they become an integral part of our consciousness. Our individuating Me implies, of course, always a state of direct love for ourselves. And in any action which springs from this feeling we are prompted by pleasurable emotions. This love was and remains the root of any action which concerns ourselves. The social Me implies a high regard for the principle of other individual existences. This comes to us in the form of an obligation, and action toward others always has this basis, at least from the point of its genesis and if judged as a truly social act based on intentional similar reaction to that of others. One function of the two Me's must be, therefore, to influence one another in such a manner that the motive for action of the one becomes the motive for action of the other. In other words, the individuating Me—representing at present pleasurable action—is to react upon the social Me—representing obligatory action—so frequently and in such manner, that the obligatory action becomes pleasurable. The social Me, on the other hand, is to react on the individuating Me so frequently and in such manner that the actions which are *permanently* pleasurable shall become obligatory. By permanently pleasurable we mean those actions which have a beneficial tendency for the individual, and increase his well-being in every respect. The merely temporary pleasurable actions have the opposite effect; they undermine, instead of increase well-being. To strike another when angry, to indulge in over-eating when hungry, to drink more liquor than necessary, are undoubtedly pleasurable actions for the time being; but their end is destruction. To forgive an enemy, to work regularly, to eat and drink moderately, are not always keenly and immediately pleasurable acts; but their end is the well-being of the individual. Man is often tempted to do what is immediately pleasurable at the cost of what is permanently so; and the function of the social Me is to react on the individuating Me so that the permanent

¹ Cf. p. 79.

² Cf. p. 80.

pleasures become established and the temporary ones are dropped. If we remember that the social Me is identified principally with the will and the intellect, we shall understand that this reaction means simply a refining of the elementary feelings. And the refining, broadening and deepening of the emotions we have seen to be essential to the progress of the individual. On the other hand, obligatory actions must become at least mildly pleasurable through the reaction of the individuating Me, if the individual is not to wear himself out in a short time in the conflict between duty and inclination.

And again, if the symbols of the organization become an integral part of the individual's consciousness by reaction of the cognitions upon the feelings, the social conditions will be reflected from his own particular angle; the initiative of the individual will thus be increased, and the organization will profit through a reaction of the individuating upon the social Me. When we ask people, *e. g.*, in a political crisis, to examine the issues carefully, we mean that they should not be satisfied with giving them merely an intellectual assent, but that their knowledge concerning them should react upon the emotions, so that right action may follow concerning the issues. In other words, we ask people to look at social questions from their own particular angle, in order to find and suggest new solutions for them. We have thus another series of reactions between the two Me's, resulting in benefit both for society and for the individual, since the latter preserves and increases his initiative and the former gets a new solution for a problem.

This brings us to the last point in this section: the growth of the individual and of society through reciprocal interaction. We may extend the scope of the individuating Me for this purpose. All those activities which satisfy purely individual wants, idiosyncracies, and predilections belong to the individuating Me, because they are all more or less directly traceable to pleasure as their original motive. These actions have, of course, indirectly a social bearing, on account of the unity of the individual's self-consciousness. But they have primarily

to do with the individual alone. How to spend my leisure hours is, for instance, a question which concerns almost entirely me alone. Am I to read, to write poetry, to play the violin, take a spin on my wheel, etc.? The carrying out of any one of these plans will involve other people to a greater or lesser extent. If I decide, *e. g.*, to write poetry in order to give expression to my own feelings about a bird, and do not insist on reading the lines to my friends or having them published, the action concerns me alone; if I insist, however, on one or both of the latter two alternatives, my action may have considerable results, both for me, the friends, and society. Still, the writing of poetry is primarily an individual predilection, and belongs to the individuating Me. If, on the other hand, I decide a question as a public official in a certain way, my action has immediate results, and may effect thousands of people much more than it does me individually. Such action belongs to the social Me, because it concerns me only indirectly. We may, perhaps, identify the activity of the social Me with the public activity of an official, and that of the individuating Me with his activity as a private citizen. This is a "rough and ready" distinction, but it will, I trust, be understood in the light of the preceding discussion.

How does, then, the individual and society grow? Or, in what way does the interaction between the two contribute towards the development of both?

Every cognition, volition and emotion is a new determination of the individual, because it is a new relation to his environment. An increase of relations means, therefore, an increase in the fulness of life; since life, both of individuals and of societies, is measured by relations; a small life has few of them, a full life many. But new relations must come, as indicated, principally from without; and the individual must, on the other hand, be ready to use them. The internal and the external factors must meet. This means, however, a close interrelation and interdependence between the individual and the organization. The social Me grows by reactions upon stimuli from the individuating Me; it depends, therefore, on the latter for its

growth. Again, the individuating Me grows through reactions upon stimuli from the social Me; its growth depends, therefore, on the latter. The social Me is, however, nothing but the organization taken into the consciousness of the individual; and the individuating Me stands simply for the individual as a member of society. The individual and the organization are, thus, interdependent. One is indispensable to the other's growth.

Let us take an illustration to make this clear. It is reasonable to suppose that at any given moment the psychical energy of the organization is a fixed quantity. In order to get this quantity, society would have to draw on each member for a certain amount of his total energies. Suppose now that Goethe had to give sixty per cent. of his total energies to his various public duties at Weimar. This would leave forty per cent. of his energies free. This respective percentage is purely hypothetical; but a large percentage of Goethe's strength was certainly not employed in public duties. What did he do with these forty per cent. of energy—his individuating Me? He read, wrote, painted, etc.; in short, did any number of things which he liked, and which had no connection with his official duties. Thus he enriched his individuating Me. But Goethe was a thinking being, and he could not help trying to relate the increased powers of his individuating Me to those of his social Me in order to make his universe one. The equilibrium of this universe had, however, been disturbed by the fact that the energies of the individuating Me had increased from forty to fifty per cent. out of a possible hundred, while the social Me still claimed and got its sixty. Since a man cannot annihilate psychical energy, and since Goethe could not, consequently, reduce his individuating Me to its former proportions, only one thing was left for him to do for the restoration of his equilibrium: the individuating Me must react upon the social Me, and bring it up ten per cent. The balance would thus be restored. But there would be an increased amount of power in both the social and the individuating Me's, so that the proportion of the sum total of present energies of the *Me* or *Ego* to the sum total

of its former energies would be 120 to 100, while the energy of the social Me to that of the individuating Me would still be in the ratio of sixty to forty in a possible hundred. The absolute power of the Ego would have increased, while the relative energies of the two Me's would be the same, and the equilibrium restored. But this increased power means new relations to the organization, and thus the opportunity for a new disturbance of the balance would be presented. The disturbance would, however, come this time from the social Me, because, although its increased relations mean new power, this power is only potential, *i. e.*, it consists only of vague and indefinite ideas which have to be sifted and brought into definite relations to the individuating Me by reaction, in order to become actual power; since only that power is actual, *i. e.*, effective, in which the emotions are enlisted. But these new emotions mean an increase in the energies of the individuating Me. In Goethe's case this constant increase of power was manifested by the greater importance of the new offices to which he was appointed, and by the ever-widening range of his literary and scientific interests. We need not look, however, for historic examples. Modern life furnishes them in great abundance. The lawyer, the business man, the magistrate, and other men who must spend a great deal of energy in public duties, draw constantly on their social Me; but this can be done only so long as the individuating Me is strong and serves as a reserve. As soon as this reserve is nearly exhausted, reactions cease, and public duties suffer. The official must take a vacation, replenish his reserve, and thus strengthen the individuating Me in order to enable it to react on the social Me. Through his official activities he may have learnt of some new ways and places of recreation, and thus be in a better position to strengthen his individuating Me. There is, thus, a constant interchange of reactions between the two Me's, and the individual grows by means of them. The hypothetical case of the respective percentage in the two Me's of Goethe may seem fanciful. But something of the kind is going on in the consciousness of the individual. He must constantly balance his

private interests with his public duties, and *vice versa*. The balance is, of course, never struck evenly, since that would mean stagnation. But if our initial supposition is correct, that the individual must reproduce in his own consciousness what is going on in society, if he is to understand it and take an active part in it,¹ then the hypothetical case of Goethe may correspond to a reality. One thing is, however, certain, that the individual grows only through the interplay of activities between society and himself.

How does the organization grow? When a man has fully absorbed the spirit of his times, he is an expression of that age. That very fact raises him head and shoulder above his fellows. because he has a large amount of social energies set free, which greatly enrich the individuating Me. He commands a larger view of the future and diagnoses its possibilities. His intimate knowledge of the organization enables him to see its weaknesses and its points of strength. He will set about removing the former, and developing the latter. In this way he will become a man of power, and incite others to imitation. Says Professor Small: "That is, men have taken the measure of themselves in the person of more strenuous men. Great men have shown what is latent in little men. Rare men have explored the possibilities of life for mediocre men, and average life has tended to achieve the fulness and diversity of many exceptional lives. Extraordinary men have roused desires dormant in ordinary men, and thus humanity has progressively found itself. Humanity has expressed itself, and exerted itself, and asserted in its most forceful specimens, and in them and in their works the rest of men have learned to know their nature, power, and destiny."² This is a good statement of the influence of the powerful individual upon the organization, and of the way mankind has progressed in ages *past*. The influence of psychical energy going out from one strong individual cannot possibly be calculated; not even the cubical ratio would be

¹ Cf. p. 3 and pp. 80 ff.

² *Meaning of the Social Movement*. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. III, No. 3, p. 347, November, 1897.

adequate to measure its increasing force. The rapidity with which the vaguest rumor spreads, and the dreadful mischief it can accomplish, is a familiar example. It may also be admitted, that in ages past when physical strength played the rôle of defender of life and property, the man of brawn and muscle was looked upon as a leader. With security of life and property in a more highly organized society, and with the spread of education, all this has changed; because *the struggle has passed from the physical into the mental realm.*

This transition has brought about two changes in regard to leadership. The sphere of influence of the leader has been limited; and he is required to add moral qualities to those of physical and purely intellectual powers. There must be a bond of union between him and his fellow-men not merely of self-interest, much less of ruler and subject, but of man with man in mutual sympathy. In former times, when the number of educated men was limited, it was possible for the few to wield the destinies of the many at their own pleasure, since the majority did not understand and did not care for the intricacies of statecraft. Education has spread knowledge about these and other subjects among the masses, and has thus both individualized and socialized them in a higher degree. It was possible as late as the seventeenth century for Louis XIV. to say, "*L'état, c'est moi*;" because he could without serious contradiction look upon his subjects as mere tax-payers and *Kanonenfutter*. Such a claim would now be resented keenly by the people, because they not only know that they have rights, but they know, too, how to exercise them. The people have learned that they are integral parts of the whole, and that the latter must suffer if they are deprived of all rights in its management. They stand, therefore, by their rights, and take an ever increasing part in the affairs of the state.

Owing to this fact we have now many leaders. In a well-educated organization every member is, in fact, a leader, *i. e.*, an initiator. By discharging his duties diligently and intelligently, he becomes a master of the sphere of activity assigned to him. He finds out the defects and possibilities of the organ-

ization in his particular realm. He attempts to correct the former, and to develop the latter. He is, consequently, not only a means "to keep the wheels going," but he becomes an agent in the development of the whole organization, since the latter's welfare depends partly on him. It is due to this initiative on the part of the lower members of the state that some of the best laws have been passed in recent years, which have resulted in great benefit to the whole, *e. g.*, labor laws. Again, the fact that so many inventions and improvements in machinery come from working men, is sufficient proof that the members of the organization are keeping alive their individuality, and increase their initiative by increasing their relations to the whole. There are, consequently, many leaders now where formerly there used to be only a few. This is especially the case in countries where industrialism is said to have killed individuality, as in England and America. The population of these countries is not only more intelligent in a general way, but has considerably more initiative than that of other countries, simply because their relations to the life of the whole are more numerous, and because they deliberately try to increase them. A man may work eight hours in a factory and do the same things over day after day. But if he takes an interest in his work, he will soon find opportunities to improve upon his methods, and thus gain leisure to think of more important matters than those immediately before him.

Again, the leader must now have moral qualities besides those of physical prowess and intellectual keenness. In ages past when life and property had to be defended with a strong hand, the people were willing to sacrifice everything to the leader, because he protected these elementary goods. But since these are secure, the people follow only him who uses his power for the benefit of the organization rather than for his own aggrandizement. A leader must now endeavor to raise his followers to his own level. For this is essentially the function of the true leader. It brings us back, however, to the question, how does the organization grow?

The discussion thus far has brought out the fact that this

growth takes place through the instrumentality of the strong men; the men who have absorbed the spirit of the organization, and have retained a strong individuating Me, for whose energies they do not find sufficient employment in social activity. What do they do with this energy? If they are morally degraded, they will employ it by indulging in vices. If they are not, *i. e.*, if they wish to maintain the unity of their consciousness, their individuating Me must react on their social Me, and they are thus forced to act with the organization. Two paths are open here. Men of keen intellect and good administrative ability, will use this power for the exploitation of their fellow-men by making the most of the defects of the organization. They will become powerful, and thus awaken powers that are dormant in weaker men. But they will arouse only the baser passions, those of greed and domination. They are leaders in corruption. And they must lose the unity of their conscience, since they are not developing, but depressing other men. As leaders they do not benefit the organization; at least not directly and purposely. Untold harm is done by men of this class, because they are, perhaps, respectable people in private life; but they corrupt social ideals so thoroughly by their business methods, that it takes a long time to overcome the baneful influence of even one of them. For organizations live as much by their ideals as individuals do. If, on the other hand, these strong men possess moral qualities in addition to intellectual and administrative ability, they try to improve the defects and to develop the possibilities of the organization. They will thus constantly maintain the unity of their consciousness, because they feel that only in a developing community can they develop their own individuality.

Are they able to accomplish these two tasks at the same time? We have seen that life is measured by relations. And the leader, by entering into his social work with his whole strength, will increase the number of his relations; his social Me will, consequently, react upon his individuating Me, and he will thus again have a large amount of energies set free. The individuating Me will react upon the social Me, and a new

circle of reactions will begin. But the leader will always keep ahead of the procession, although he will sometimes have to follow the leadership of another; but this will only help him to develop more rapidly. "Es wächst der Mensch mit seinen grösseren Zwecken," as Schiller expresses this truth.

An illustration may, perhaps, make the matter clearer. Let us take Goethe as an example again. We assumed that he had an individuating Me of forty and a social Me of sixty per cent. Suppose now that he could be transplanted into our modern society. What would be the result? He would find the sum total of social demands so greatly increased that the discharge of his social duties would require all his strength. He could not be a minister of state, of finance, of agriculture, etc., and a great writer besides, because the demands in each of these lines have increased so greatly that any one of these departments would occupy all his energies. But suppose Goethe had lived through the last century with strength unabated, and we should have a different story. He would have grown so much by the reciprocal reactions of his two Me's, that his total energies would still be in the same proportion to the sum total of the energy of the organization, so that he would be a leader still with a large social and individuating Me. Such a supposition is, of course, impossible of realization. Something else must take place, consequently. The work must be divided among different men. One man, falling heir to the energies of the organization in a particular line, will take up that department and devote his social energies to it. As he succeeds in this endeavor he will become an authority, *i. e.*, a leader on that subject; if he should meet with great success, he would leave the work of that department so extended that a further subdivision would be necessary. Thus the number of leaders is growing all the time through the influence of other leaders. Increased specialization is, therefore, both the proof of the increase of social energies, and the means of its increase. And social energies may increase *ad infinitum*, since there is practically no limit to specialization. This means, however, that the social organization is dynamic because its members are so

by virtue of their conscious attitude, *i. e.*, by their ability to do the work of society without being fully absorbed by it.

What will become of leadership under these conditions? Two changes will take place; one in the mode of government, the other in the quality of the leaders. We have seen that specialization increases the number of leaders. Government must, therefore, become co-operation between different leaders. Men who have mastered one subject of a department must confer with each other; leaders of similar departments again, must co-operate with each other, and so on in an ascending scale. Since the initiative must, however, come more and more from below, *i. e.*, from the specialists of limited subjects, the leaders of the highest groups will have to become to a large extent mere executive officers, *i. e.*, they will transmit orders received from below from one department to another, and thus regulate the different activities of the social body by co-ordinating them. And the great leader will be the man who can do this with the least amount of delay and friction, so that the organization can adapt itself to changing conditions as quickly as an organism does. Such men are, of course, rare; but they are the true leaders in the modern state, which teems with constantly varying conditions and complex situations; and they are, moreover, always certain to be sought out by their fellow-men just on account of their rarity.

There will also be a change in the quality of the leader. As leadership is confined to smaller spheres, supervision becomes more easy, and inefficiency is discovered more quickly. The leader is, therefore, compelled to do his best in order to retain his position. He must be a moral man at least externally, *i. e.*, he must discharge his duties to the best of his ability so that his work may result in the greatest possible benefit to the organization. And in order to meet this requirement he must retain a strong individuating Me, so that it may increase the energies of the social Me by reaction. If he uses up all his energies in social duties, he will have no reserves to draw on, nor resources to apply in times of emergency; he will lose his initiative, and thus unfit himself for leadership. Many men in

positions of large responsibility have exhausted their powers for leadership prematurely, because they failed to take sufficient rest in order to let their individuating Me develop. The justification of rest and recreation consists in this necessity to maintain the initiative. A man may continue to turn out the same quantity of work for a long time, but the quality will suffer; especially when the work requires great skill in the adjustment of complex conditions.

The organization develops, then, through the instrumentality of leaders. But every member of the social body may become a leader in a limited sphere, because every human being has an individuating Me, and, therefore, the power of initiative. And the greatness of a leader consists in the power to evoke and draw out the faculty of the initiative in those over whom he is set as commander. In order to do this successfully, he must be able to inspire love and enthusiasm in his fellowmen. With mere shrewdness and skillful manipulation he will, however, never succeed in this matter, since he will be discovered very quickly. He must have, therefore, those emotional qualities which he would call forth in the hearts of his fellowmen—love, kindness, sympathy, enthusiasm. He must be a man in complete unity with himself, because he is at one with the members of the organization through the bond of fraternal love. And the truly great leader is at one with himself; because he knows that the great power which has come to him through his social activity, means a greater responsibility for others; because he is determined that this power shall be exercised for the benefit of the organization; and, lastly, because he feels that the people—recognizing him as a just steward—will respond and support their leader in his endeavor to make them more fully socialized and individualized men and women. He is thus completely balanced within himself, and completely adjusted to his environment. These two facts assure the welfare both of the individual and of the organization.

CONCLUSION.

IF this treatise has been successful in proving that feeling is the principle of individuation as well as of socialization, three inferences may be made: the first is psychological, the second ethical, the third sociological. The *psychological* inference would be: The unity of consciousness is to be found, not in the intellect or the will, but in feeling; the *ethical*, The individual passes through the stages of the race in his moral development; the *sociological*, The organization must aim at producing as many emotions of a positive kind as possible in its members, if it is not to break down.

The unity of consciousness is not to be found in the intellect or the will, but in feeling. Owing to their failure to recognize this fact, both the intellectualistic and the voluntaristic schools have not succeeded in developing a psychology which would stand the test of time. The former took up the study of the individual at a comparatively late stage when the psychical energy had already been differentiated. And by supposing the intellect to be the primary and principal faculty of the mind, the intellectualists did not succeed in producing a satisfactory psychology of the individual. Vague terms—such as “the universal” and “the particular”—had to take the place of careful investigation of the facts of consciousness. While this attitude was fairly satisfactory for a time from a philosophical point of view, and while it has been a great force in the development of philosophy, it has failed as a psychology, because it cannot explain individual differences, *e. g.*, those in reaction. Since, if the intellect is the principal psychical energy, these differences ought to be explicable; but we know that they are not, because many emotions cannot be reduced to terms of intellect. If, on the other hand, the feelings are the principal psychical energy and are largely individual, *i. e.*, incommuni-

cable, then psychology has simply to state the fact, and leave it to philosophy to look further back for these differences. The voluntarists, again, have to introduce their *deus ex machina* all the time in order to explain phenomena of the undifferentiated animal and child mind. Voluntaristic philosophy, too, has had a great influence on psychology, because it called attention to an essential element of our consciousness, which had been neglected by the preceding intellectualists; but by over-emphasizing the will it failed to give an adequate account of the phenomena of consciousness, because it could not derive them from volitions. Scientific modern psychology justly begins its investigations with sensation, and with entire propriety lays great stress on this elementary phenomenon of our consciousness, because here we have, indeed, the one *permanent* element of our minds. And larger and more satisfactory results may be looked for if psychologists should recognize the emotional side of a sensation more than they have hitherto, because through the differentiation of feeling we come to a knowledge of ourselves as self-conscious.

The individual passes through the stages of the race in his moral development. The child is at first ethically indifferent, because his mind is not sufficiently differentiated. As soon as he begins to act more intelligently, he is a pronounced eudemonist, since he seeks pleasures, consisting principally of pleasurable sensations. It is bald egoism. When he becomes conscious of the discord between himself and society, he becomes a dualist, since he does or must do things as he is forced to do them by persuasion or fear of punishment according to a rigorous standard. When his mind is sufficiently differentiated, and the standard has become internal instead of external, he strives after self-realization, with general happiness and well-being as indices. And the first two steps have to be repeated time and again in order to assure the third.

But these are the stages through which the race has passed. The savage is baldly egotistic and looks only for pleasurable sensations. Semi-civilized man has an external standard in the form of custom to which he must conform. Fully civilized

man has an internal standard, since he has overcome the law by taking it into his own consciousness. If the progress of the race is measured by that of historic nations and if the feeling of sin or guilt is taken as an index to individual morality, we might take the pre-Socratic Greeks as an example of the first, the ancient Hebrews of the second, and Christian nations of the third. It is remarkable, too, that the same stages have recurred in philosophy several times. The Ionians had a somewhat hedonistic idea of ethics, and the Pythagoreans a more rigoristic one; Socrates held the mean between the two. The Cyrenaics preach pleasure, and the Cynics decry it; but Aristotle unites the two in his conception of temperance and balance. The Epicureans again are hedonists, and the Stoics rigorists; the Neo-Platonists unite the two views in their conception of music, love and philosophy. Such a swinging to and fro of the pendulum was possible only so long as the proper view of the individual as a unity in time and eternity had not been established. With this view—introduced by Christianity—once firmly rooted in the consciousness of the nations, such extremes in philosophical ethics have become impossible, although there are still many and various opinions on the subject. But the conception of the individual as a unity has, nevertheless, saved us from the error of going to such extremes as many Greek philosophers did; but caution is still needed if we would have a sane ethical system.

The organization must aim at producing as many emotions of a positive kind as possible. We have maintained all through, that strong individuals are necessary for a healthy organic life of society. We have seen that positive, refined, and healthy emotions alone can give strength to the individual, and that necessary buoyancy which acts as a tonic in times of depression to which an industrial age is so frequently subject. And these emotions must be evoked in as many members of the society as possible, since the life of each contributes to the total life of the organization. When we look at the complexity of modern industrial life and notice our dependence on so many factors which we have conquered as a race but are subject to as

single individuals, we have a feeling akin to that of the savage over against the forces of nature—of helplessness. The individual almost disappears behind the achievements in political and industrial life. Our wealth has increased in respect to externals, but we have paid a high price for it, since we have lost our healthy emotions. Modern civilization is tainted with over-stimulation of an intellectual kind, since industrialism is dependent on a complex intellectual life. The result of this over-stimulation is the reduction of mental life to mere intellectualism: we are blasé, dare not rejoice frankly, criticise everything and everybody. The spring of life—a healthy and wholesome buoyancy—is gone. This can be restored only by paying more attention to the things which call forth emotions; the positive, out-going emotions of joy and sympathy in all their various forms.

VITA

RUDOLPH M. BINDER was born in Hetzeldorf, Austria Hungary. After receiving his general education, he came to America and entered a theological seminary of the German Lutheran Church. Upon graduation, he preached for a short time in Ohio. From there he went to Harvard College and received the degree of B. A., after two years' study. Then he spent two years at the University of Chicago, studying philosophy and theology, receiving the degree of B. D., in 1898. Upon coming to New York he studied at Columbia University and the General Theological Seminary for one year, and became assistant minister in Grace Parish for two years, continuing his studies at Columbia. In 1900, he went to Oxford University as Eigenbrodt Fellow of the General Theological Seminary to study philosophy. On his return he became instructor of pedagogy in the General Theological Seminary, which position he now holds, together with an assistantship in St. Bartholomew's Parish.

In preparation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, he studied principally philosophy, psychology and sociology; but he included the study of comparative religion, and took a course in law—its origin and meaning—in order to gain a broader point of view.

